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Aggregation by Acquisition:
Replacing Class Actions with a Market for
Legal Claims
Charles R Korsmo & Minor Myers*
ABSTRACT: The traditionalclass action is broken, and we propose to replace
it with a new mechanism for structuring mass claims: aggregation by
acquisition. We argue that legal causes of action should be freely alienable,
such that even small claims could be bought and sold. In such a world,
financiers could purchase claims (or shares of claims) directly from
individualclaim holders, assemblinga mass of claims that may be negativevalue if litigated individually but positive-value when litigated together.
Aggregation in this way would solve the same collective action problems as
class actions and derivative actions, but without generating the serious
pathologies that plague those proceduraldevices.
Our proposalmay sound like a fanciful thought experiment, but in fact it is
already at work in one small corner of corporate litigation: stockholder
appraisal. We present the example of appraisalhere-where claims effectively
trade with shares of stock and where litigationappearsstrongly meritoriousas a microcosm of how aggregate litigation would work under our proposal.
As we explain in this Article, our proposalwould improve the deterrent effect
of private litigation, would deliverfaster and more concrete relief to injured
persons, and would minimize the volume of nuisance litigation. While
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aggregation by acquisition may hold promise across a broad swath of
substantive law, it could most easily be put into practice in corporate and
securities litigation. We outline the reforms necessaryfor doing so. Extending
our proposal to other spheres of litigation would be more complex, raising
many serious but potentially surmountable obstacles.
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INTRODUCTION

The class action-the principal mechanism in our civil justice system for
dealing with mass claims-is a brilliant but fundamentally flawed procedural
device. When a large number of people have suffered an injury arising out of
a common set of facts, many or all of the individual victims may have suffered
harms that are small in relation to the cost of bringing a lawsuit. In the face
of collective action problems, the injured parties may go uncompensated
and-perhaps more problematically-private litigation can provide little
deterrence against conduct that generates substantial aggregate harm.
Scenarios abound where collective action problems threaten to paralyze
litigation, ranging from mass tort actions involving toxic exposures to
products liability actions to consumer antitrust actions to stockholder suits.
To solve this problem, American law currently relies on procedure. The
primary procedural mechanisms are the class action and, for certain types of
stockholder suit, the derivative action.' In such actions, an individual plaintiff

1. As discussed below, the derivative action device is an attempt to solve a somewhat
different problem than the class action. In a derivative action, a stockholder in a corporation
seeks to remedy an injury that is suffered, in the first instance, by the corporation. In theory, there
should already exist a mechanism-the corporation itself-for overcoming the collective action
problems that would otherwise plague dispersed shareholders. What the derivative action
mechanism seeks to address is not so much a collective action problem as an especially acute
agency problem as a result of the conflict of interest that arises when the alleged wrongdoers are
the directors and officers who control the corporation. Despite these somewhat different
purposes, derivative actions and class actions have sufficient similarities to be taken together for
most of the purposes of this Article.
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with claims that are ostensibly "typical" of the larger group seeks to bring an
action on behalf of the entire group. Absent parties are bound by the
resolution of the claim unless, where possible, they affirmatively opt out.2 In
theory, this individual plaintiff can represent the aggregate group
unhampered by collective action problems. Although the class action has in
recent years been in reputed decline,3 it is still regarded as one of the most
important innovations of modern civil procedure.4
In practice, however, entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys in pursuit of a
contingency fee are almost always the key players in aggregate litigation. The
plaintiffs' attorneys typically identify and seek out a representative plaintiff,
rather than the other way around. Virtually all of the key decisions-including
the decision to bring a suit, the litigation strategy, and the decision to settleare made, for all practical purposes, by the attorneys and not by the putative
client. The plaintiffs' attorney will almost always have a vastly greater
economic stake in the outcome of the litigation than any individual plaintiff,
and will often have incentives that diverge sharply from those of the class. The
tragedy of the class action is that the very same collective action problems that
gave rise to the device in the first place also doom any effort to monitor the
performance of the attorney acting on behalf of the class. Other players in the
litigation-namely, the defendants and the court-have incentives that do not
align with the interests of the class. The net result is that procedural methods
of aggregation solve the collective action problems, but at the cost of
generating a pervasive agency problem in their stead.
In this Article, we propose an alternative, market form of aggregation of
dispersed claims-aggregation by acquisition. At least in most circumstances,
we would do away with court-supervised procedural aggregation of claims and
with binding results for all class members. Instead, our proposal envisions that
legal claims be made freely alienable. Financiers could purchase claims (or
shares of claims) directly from individual claim holders, assembling a mass of
claims that may be negative-value if litigated individually but positive-value
when litigated together. Such aggregation would solve the same collective
2.
Opt-out class actions are very rare in corporate litigation, for example. See, e.g., Transcript
of Oral Argument on Class Certification at 14, Lee v. Pincus, No. 8 4 5 8-CB (Del. Ch. Argued Nov.
20, 2015) ("[Olverwhelmingly cases in this Court are certified under (b) (i) and (b) (2).").

3. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, go WASH. U. L. REv. 729 (2013)
(discussing recent efforts by courts to curb the number of class actions and arguing a return to a
more balanced approach to encourage class actions as a monitoring device); Georgene Vairo, Is
the Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for Class Members?, 64 EMORY L.J. 477 (2014)
(discussing the decline of class actions as a result of court-imposed stringent certification
requirements).
4. William T. Allen, Commentary on the Limits of Compensation and Deterrencein Legal Remedies,
6o LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 73 (1997) ("[T]he class action is the preeminent innovation
allowing the compensatory goal to serve the deterrent function more effectively."); Stephen
Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperativefor Comprehensive Revision of the Class
DamageAction, 8o COLUM. L. REV. 299, 299 (1980) (noting that the class damage action has been
"hailed by some as the most important procedural innovation of this century").
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action problems as the class and derivative action mechanisms but would do
so without generating the serious agency problem that arises in the class
action. The financier would actually own the claims and would possess both
the concentrated economic stake and sophistication to supervise whatever
attorney is ultimately hired.5
A market for legal claims already exists, albeit one that is highly
constrained and imperfect. Holders of legal claims can currently "sell" their
claim in only two ways. First, they can sell it to defendants, via a settlement.
The obvious downside that there is only one potential "buyer." Second, the
holder of a legal claim may sell a portion of it to a plaintiffs' attorney in the
form of a contingency fee.7 Again, though, this market is highly constrained
in the identity of the potential buyer (plaintiffs' attorneys only), the amount
of the claim that may be sold (typically not more than one-third), and in the
type of consideration the buyer may provide (payment in kind in the form of
legal services).8

A broader market would allow for greater competition and specialization
in ways that should ultimately benefit injured parties. In fact, a nascent market
for legal claims has begun to develop over the past two decades, in the form
of the litigation finance industry. While still relatively small in scale and
constrained in scope, litigation finance has become a focus of sustained
scholarly attention.9 As presently practiced, litigation financing generally
5. Our proposal is related in many ways to Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller's
pioneering proposal to auction mass claims. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, lo5-16 (199). For the distinct advantages of
our proposal relative to an auction, see infra Part IV.E.
6. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Commentary, On the Costs of CivilJustice,8o TEX. L. REV. 2115,
2115 (2002) ("A lawsuit is essentially a sale. The defendant buys a valuable asset from the
plaintiff, in the form of a release of claims if the case is settled, or a verdict with resjudicataeffect
if the case goes to a verdict."); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a
ProceduralProblem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 72 (201o) ("A lawsuit represents an asset for the plaintiff and
a liability for the defendant, and in this respect, litigation settlements resemble other market
transactions. But unlike the efficient markets that we routinely rely on to price all sorts of assets
and liabilities accurately, the market for litigation claims is uniquely limited to just two
participants. The plaintiff can sell only to the defendant and the defendant can deal only with
the plaintiff." (footnotes omitted)); William B. Rubenstein, A TransactionalModel ofAdjudication,
89 GEO. L.J. 371, 372 (2001) ("In complex class actions, defendants purchase a commodityfinality. They buy from the plaintiffs' representative the plaintiffs' rights to sue.").
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Part III.B. In a recent paper, Baker explored the potential of expanded claim
alienability in the context of mass tort claims. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Alienability of Mass Tort
Claims, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 (2014). Her focus was on the alienation of claims to attorneysselling ioo% of the claim instead of the more conventional 40% through a contingency fee. Id.
at 275. She concluded that "there are no compelling normative or economic reasons to prohibit
the sale of mass tort personal injury claims to attorneys" and suggested that this reasoning could
be extended to "the sale of any type of claim to any interested purchaser or investor." Id. at 303.
9. Notable contributions to this literature include: Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers
as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273 (2012); Terrence Cain, Third Party
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involves a stranger to a claim funding litigation in exchange for a stake in the
proceeds, generally structured like a contingency fee. Litigation finance,
however, holds out little promise for aggregate claims because their current
procedural structure means that only attorneys have control. o There is thus
no reason to believe that litigation finance will do anything to align the
interests of plaintiffs' attorneys with class members. Indeed, the financier's
incentives will themselves diverge from the interests of class members. Thus,
rather than ameliorating the agency problem between plaintiffs and their
attorneys," litigation finance as currently practiced layers a new agency
problem on top of the old one.

Funding of PersonalInjury Tort Claims: Keep the Baby and Changethe Bathwater, 8g CHI.-KENT L. REV.
11 (2014); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 288 (2010); Wendy Gerwick Couture, SecuritiesRegulation of Alternative LitigationFinance,
42 SEC. REG. L.J. 5 (2014); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 377 (2014); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Re-Re-FinancingCivil Litigation:How Lawyer
Lending Might Remake the American Litigation Landscape, Again, 61 UCLA L. REv. DISCOURSE i 10
(2013); Bert I. Huang, Litigation Finance: What Do Judges Need to Know?, 45 COLUM.J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 525 (2012); Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Third-PartyFinanced Litigation, 8J.L. ECON.
& POL'Y 701 (201 2);Jasminka Kalajdzic et al.,justiceforProfit:A ComparativeAnalysis ofAustralian,
Canadianand U.S. Third Party LitigationFunding, 61 AM.J. COMP. L. 93 (20 13);Jonathan T. Molot,
A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2oog); Molot, supra note 6; Cassandra Burke
Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financingon TransnationalLitigation, 44 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L
L. 159 (201 1); AnthonyJ. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From Champerty to Insurance,
6o DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (201 1); AnthonyJ. Sebok, Should the Law Preserve Party Control? Litigation
Investment, InsuranceLaw, and Double Standards, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 833 (2015) [hereinafter
Sebok, Should the Law Preserve Party Control?]; AnthonyJ. Sebok & W. Bradley Wendel, Duty in the
Litigation-InvestmentAgreement: The Choice Between Tort and ContractNorms When the DealBreaks Down,
66 VAND. L. REV. 1831 (2013); Maya Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing
Legal Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889 (2013) [hereinafter Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the
Window?]; Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (2012)
[hereinafter Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract]; Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?
Third Party LitigationFunding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (201 1) [hereinafter Steinitz, Whose Claim Is
This Anyway?]; Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 711 (2014); W. Bradley Wendel, A Legal Ethics Perspective on Alternative Litigation Financing,
55 CANADIAN. Bus. L.J. 133 (2014); Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL
L. REV. 183 (2001); and Mariel Rodak, Comment, It's About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of
the LitigationFinanceIndustry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2oo6).
See infra Part III.D.
10.
11. As discussed below, it has been suggested that litigation financiers can at least partially
address the agency problem between plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys by serving as more
effective monitors of the attorneys. See generally Burch, supra note g (suggesting alternative
litigation financing as a tool to monitor attorneys representing plaintiffs in a mass litigation). This
argument parallels the thinking of the "lead plaintiff' provisions of the PSLRA. See Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § ios(a)-(b), 109 Stat. 737,
738-40, 743-45 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2012)). See generally ElliotJ.
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:How InstitutionalInvestors Can Reduce
Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995). As discussed more fully below,
we expect that financiers will not perform much better as monitors than lead plaintiffs have under
the PSLRA. See infra Part II.C.
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Full acquisition of legal claims, as we propose here, removes the
representative plaintiff and her counsel from the central role in aggregate
litigation. Instead of simply adding another interested party into a situation
already fraught with agency problems, aggregation by acquisition reduces the
number of players, replacing a dispersed and potentially fractious group of
small claimants with a concentrated and motivated acquirer. There are several
reasons such aggregation promises substantial benefits and may ultimately
help generate litigation outcomes more closely related to the merits. First,
aggregation by acquisition can help to overcome capital constraints and risk
aversion that might otherwise skew litigation outcomes. Second, our proposal
turns otherwise one-shot parties into repeat players, helping to equalize
bargaining power and the ability and incentive to influence legal change.
Third, it could lead to specialization that could help to reduce the costs of
litigation and the distortions such costs impose on litigation outcomes.
Finally, our proposal would result in better-and, in some cases, more
timely-compensation for injured parties.
Two notes are in order at the outset. First, a handful of prior papers to
consider the economics of a market for legal claims have considered
"unmatured claims"-that is, potential future injuries that have not yet
occurred." Such an analysis is of interest in thinking through schemes of
insurance and waivers of liability, but does not necessarily involve assignment
of choses of action or implicate bars on champerty or maintenance. We are
concerned in this Article with matured claims-that is, with injuries that have
already occurred-which pose strikingly different questions.
Second, we assume throughout that the substantive laws are themselves
normatively desirable. We further assume that private enforcement of the law
is also normatively desirable as a matter of public policy. That is, we assume
that the laws ought to be enforced, and that they ought to be enforced by
private litigation rather than, or in addition to, other tools of law
enforcement, and that optimal policy would be for litigation outcomes to
mirror the "merits" under the substantive law. Thus, even though one may
question whether the current regime of, for example, securities fraud
litigation-whereby current stockholders compensate former stockholders
for out-of-pocket trading losses caused by fraudulent misrepresentations-is
optimal, we push all such doubts to the side for present purposes. Doing so is
justified by the sense that the best solution to bad substantive law is to modify
the substantive law, rather than to distort the process of litigation in the hope
that out of such distortions will fortuitously arise better outcomes from a social
policy perspective.
This Article is structured as follows. Part II provides a brief summary of
collective action problems in mass litigation, and the law's traditional

12.

See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REv.

383 (1989).
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procedural responses to these problems. This Part also introduces the
problem of agency costs in aggregate litigation and outlines prominent
proposals and-largely unsuccessful-attempts to reduce these costs. Part III
examines the limits on the purchase and sale of legal claims, given the central
importance of such transactions to our proposal. Part IV introduces
aggregation by acquisition-a full market for legal claims-and argues that it
would deliver all of the benefits of litigation finance while also solving the
agency problems inherent in both litigation finance and traditional
mechanisms of claim aggregation. This Part also presents empirical evidence
on appraisal litigation-a form of stockholder litigation where aggregation by
acquisition is already possible-to demonstrate the promise of markets for
legal claims. Part V introduces and addresses possible objections to
aggregation by acquisition. Part VI suggests a number of legal reforms
necessary for a robust market for legal claims to flourish in the corporate and
securities context and sets out some general thoughts on how the proposal
might be implemented more broadly.
II.

COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS AND AGENCY COSTS

The class action is a procedural innovation that arose in response to
collective action problems in mass litigation. This Part outlines the nature of
that collective action problem and describes the design of the main
procedural devices employed to overcome it, namely the class action and the
derivative suit. Next, it introduces the agency problem that plagues such
litigation and prominent proposals designed to address that problem. Finally,
it describes various policy reforms implemented to minimize that basic agency
problem and the failure of those reforms.
A.

PROCEDURAL SOLUTIONS TO CoLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS: THE CLASS ACTION
AND DERIVATIVE SUT

Litigation suffers from the general problem of collective action.'s
Consider a securities fraud injuring thousands of people to varying degrees.
Persons with only small injuries will not bring suit, as the anticipated remedy
will not be worth the costs of bringing a lawsuit. This could prevent a suit from
being brought even where the victims in the aggregate would stand to gain
far more from a suit than the costs of litigation. Persons with larger injuries
may find litigation to be worth the candle, but they would either have to each
bear the full costs of litigation-potentially resulting in wasteful and
redundant litigation costs-or attempt to band together with other aggrieved
parties. Doing so will be plagued by the coordination issues that always attend

13. For classic accounts of collective action problems, see generally IAIN MCLEAN, PUBLIC
CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION (1987); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
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collective decision-making."' Each potential plaintiff has an incentive to free
ride and let someone else bear the cost of litigation.'5 A plaintiff who goes it
alone will bear the entire costs of a proceeding but will capture only a fraction
of the benefits. In such a world, too few claims will be brought, which has two
undesirable consequences. The first is sub-optimal deterrence of harmful
conduct because tortfeasors are not made to internalize the full costs they
impose on society. The second and related consequence is the systematic
under-compensation of victims of mass harms.
Collective-action problems in mass claims are likely to be especially acute
where a large number of injured parties do not have enough at stake to justify
incurring litigation costs individually, a common scenario in mass accidents,
products liability claims, and consumer antitrust claims, to name a few.' 6
Stockholder litigation is also virtually certain to present collective-action
problems, with small groups of large stockholders and a large pool of small
stockholders all injured by the same fraudulent misrepresentations or
breaches of fiduciary duty on the part of the corporation's officers or
directors. The cost of litigation is likely to exceed the value of any prospective
gain for any but the largest individual stockholders. 7 As a result, the
substantive rules of federal securities law and state corporate law are likely to
go under-enforced.
While traditional joinder and other small-scale methods of consolidation
can offer some level of aggregation, 8 large classes would be prohibitively
costly using these mechanisms. If private litigation is to serve as an effective
tool of deterrence and compensation, very large collections of injured parties
must resort to representative litigation, such as a class action or derivative suit.
Allowing a plaintiff to proceed on behalf of a class of similarly-situated

14. See OLSON, supra note 13, at 53; Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 9 ("Organizing the
conduct of litigation with large numbers of additional parties would be a nightmare.")
15.

SeeJanet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class

Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 535 (1991) ("The class action device makes private enforcement
economically feasible for small investors by allowing a large number of small individual claims to
be aggregated and permitting the costs of litigation to be recouped from the total recovery under
the common fund doctrine."); Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at g ("The organizer [of a mass
claim] would have no effective way of obtaining reimbursement from other plaintiffs for

[litigation] costs.").

16. SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM.
L.REV. 1343, 1410-17 (1995).
17.

See, e.g., StephenJ. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465,

1466 (2004) ("Shareholders of large publicly held corporations face a well-known collective
action problem.. . . Corporations owe their shareholders specific duties and rights. However, due

to the collective action problem, no single shareholder may seek to litigate these rights.");
Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 55, 55
(igg) ("The efficacy of shareholder litigation as a governance mechanism is hampered by
collective action problems because the cost of bringing a lawsuit, while less than the shareholders'
aggregate gain, is typically greater than a shareholder-plaintiffs pro rata benefit.").
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20 (regarding joinder of parties); id. R. 24 (regarding intervention).
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victims-or on behalf of an injured corporation via a derivative suitencourages the filing of claims where the potential recovery is equal to or
greater than the entire loss suffered by the victims.'9 It thus overcomes the
major coordination problems that would otherwise hamper the prosecution
of such claims.2o In doing so, the class action is designed to ensure that
defendants will bear the full social cost of injuries.
The class action allows the large-scale and inexpensive joining of large
numbers of absent plaintiffs.21 The dominant form of class action, governed

by Federal

Rules

of Civil Procedure

("FRCP")

2 3 (b)

(3),

allows a

representative plaintiff to file an action and request the certification of a class
if certain requirements are met.22 The class must be so large that joinder is
impractical, class members must share common questions of law and fact that
predominate individual issues, and the class representative must have claims
that typify those of other class members.23

19.
See David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the Superiority
of the Class Action, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 305, 306 (2014) ("In short, class action replaces
individualized (or decentralized, fractionated) stake holders and decision making with
centralized control over the classwide, indivisible stake and resulting incentives to optimally invest
in maximizing the expected recovery from the plaintiffs' common question case for liability.").
20.

See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of

Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 AuZ. L. REV. 559, 563-64 (1996) ("The

&

class action device is an attempt to overcome the problem of dispersed injured parties whose
damage claims are sufficiently small that they lack incentives to pursue individual litigation.
Absent the class action device, collective action problems can prevent the aggregation of
individual claims into one action that would support economically viable litigation." (footnotes
omitted)); Alexandra Lahav, FundamentalPrinciplesfor Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65,
70 (2003) ("Among other things, class actions solve the collective action problems faced by
individuals with claims too small to be economically adjudicated individually... ."); Macey
Miller, supra note 5, at 8 ("The class action is a tool for overcoming the free-rider and other
collective action problems that impair any attempt to organize a large number of discrete
individuals in any common project." (footnotes omitted)); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable

Litigation?:A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims ClassAction, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 709
(2006) ("Scholars have demonstrated that the small claims class faces what economists call a
'collective action problem' and they have applauded the class mechanism as the means by which
the class overcomes this problem."); Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class

Action and Derivative Lawsuits: A CriticalAnalysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 423, 427 (1993) ("The class
action aims to overcome the collective action problems inherent in any effort to organize a large
group of individuals into one common project.").

21.

See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (noting that "[t]he

use of the class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims ... may motivate [named
plaintiffs] to bring cases that for economic reasons might not be brought otherwise"); see also U.S.

Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980) (describing some of the justifications of
class actions being "provision of a convenient and economical means for disposing of similar
lawsuits, and the facilitation of the spreading of litigation costs among numerous litigants with

similar claims"); Arthur R. Miller, OfFrankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the "Class Action Problem, "92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979) (explaining the social value of providing
a mechanism for the litigation of small claims).
22.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (3).
23.

Id. R. 23(a)(1)-(3).
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While derivative suits, as discussed below, generate some of the same
dynamics as class actions, the rationale for the derivative suit is somewhat
different. Numerous stockholders might suffer small losses from harm
inflicted on the corporation they own, but there is already a mechanism in
place-the corporate form itself-for overcoming the collective action
problems that might otherwise stand in the way of seeking a remedy.4 The
need for the derivative suit mechanism stems from an agency problem within
the corporation-the fact that the incentives of the managers who control the
corporation often diverge from the best interests of the stockholders.25
The typical derivative suit scenario involves allegations that the corporate
managers have themselves harmed the corporation by breaching their
fiduciary duties. In such a situation, the conflict of interest is obvious, as the
managers can hardly be trusted to pursue a claim against themselves with any
zeal. A derivative action enables a representative stockholder to circumvent
the corporation's management and bring a claim on behalf of the entire
corporation.2 6 The stockholder-plaintiff stands in the shoes of the
corporation, and any recovery on the claims goes to the corporation, rather
than directly to the stockholders.27
B.

AGENCYPROBLEMS INAGGREGATE LITIGATION

By solving the basic collective action problem associated with mass claims,
class and derivative claims preserve the deterrent and compensation goals of
our civil liability system. Representative litigation, however, is not an
unalloyed good. The unavoidable problem created by both the class action
and the derivative suit is one of agency costs.
The class action and the derivative suit draft absent class members into a
relationship where their welfare depends on the decisions of the attorney who
speaks on their behalf. 8 The interests of the plaintiffs' attorney can diverge,
sometimes severely, from the interests of the class members, generating a

24.

See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at o.

See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
25.
PRIVATE PROPERTY 277-78 (1932); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors'
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL.J. CORP. L. 540 (1984).
26. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) ("Equity came to
the relief of the stockholder, who had no standing to bring civil action at law against faithless
directors and managers. Equity, however, allowed him to step into the corporation's shoes and
to seek in its right the restitution he could not demand in his own.").
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a) (describing a derivative action as brought by "one or more
27.
shareholders ... to enforce a right that the corporation or association may properly assert but
has failed to enforce").
28. See, e.g., Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 3o8 (1976) (defining an agency
relationship as one "under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision
making authority to the agent").
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predictable set of costs associated with monitoring the agent and bonding the
agent's performance.9 Together with any residual cost from unfaithful
performance on the part of the agent, these are typically dubbed "agency
costs."
In aggregate litigation, the party controlling the litigation is almost always
the plaintiffs' attorney, not the named plaintiff.so Plaintiffs' attorneys have a

financial stake in the claim that typically far outweighs that of any individual
plaintiff because they generally receive a contingency fee equal to a
percentage of any ultimate recovery. Such fees are often in the neighborhood
of 25% and regularly as high as 33%,3' but even a much smaller percentage
would be enough to dwarf the share of any individual plaintiff in a sizeable
aggregate proceeding.
Class members have virtually no incentive to monitor the plaintiffs'
attorney because their stakes are so small.32 These small stakes also make
effective monitoring by the plaintiffs highly unlikely. As Macey and Miller
have argued, class action and derivative attorneys "are subject to only minimal
monitoring by their ostensible 'clients,' who are either dispersed and
disorganized (in the case of class action litigation) or under the control of
hostile forces (in the case of derivative litigation)."ss "As a practical matter,

29.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Verus Manager: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L REv. 1, 25 (1986) (noting that "'agency costs' ... include[] both the expenditures incurred
to reduce managerial misappropriation and shirking plus the irreducible minimum of such losses");
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The CorporateContract, 89 COLUM. L REV. 1416, 1424 (1989)
("The combination of monitoring, bonding, and residual costs is called 'agency costs.'").
30. Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1487, 1520 (1996) (noting that "named plaintiffs are essentially figureheads, merely the 'key to
the courthouse door,' . . . who play no real role in directing the litigation" (quoting Saylor v.
Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, goo (2d Cir. 1972))); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION
LAW AND ECONOMICS 367 (2002) (observing that in stockholder suits "the real party in interestthe party on the plaintiffs' side with the greatest personal interest in the outcome of the
litigation-is the plaintiffs' attorney rather than the nominal shareholder-plaintiff").
See 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 14:6 ( 4 th ed.
31.
2002 & SUpp. 2014) ("[F]ee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery");
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An EmpiricalStudy of ClassAction Settlements and TheirFeeAwards, 7J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 81 1, 835 tbl.8 (2010) (reporting that the mean and median fee awards were both
around 25% over 444 federal class actions suits between 2oo6 and 2007).
32. Alexander, supranote 15, at 535 (noting that most class members "have only a nominal
stake in the litigation").
33. Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 3; see also Alexander, supranote 15, at 535 ('Just as
[individual victims] lack sufficient economic interest to bring individual actions, they also are not
motivated to sustain the information costs or expend the energy and attention required" to
effectively monitor their attorney.); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understandingthe Plaintiffs Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for PrivateEnforcement of Law Through Class and DerivativeActions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669, 678-79 (1986); James D. Cox et al., Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 1 o6 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1593 (2006) ("Class
members suffered profound collective action problems that prevented close monitoring of the
class action attorney."); Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 5 ("The named plaintiff does littleindeed, usually does nothing-to monitor the attorney in order to ensure that representation is
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then, it is the plaintiffs' attorneys . .. who decide when to initiate [class and
derivative] claims, how to prosecute them, and on what terms to settle
them."s4 This is in many ways a necessary aspect of class action litigation; the
entire premise is that none of the actual plaintiffs has sufficient incentive to
bring the suit. Recognizing this, the design of aggregate litigation thus
deliberately generates a strong incentive for the plaintiffs' attorney to act on
behalf of the class.35
In theory, the prevalence of contingency fees ought to serve to align the
interests of plaintiffs' attorneys and plaintiffs. The payoff of the plaintiffs'
attorney ought to depend on the payoff of the class members. The better the
class members do, the better the plaintiffs' attorney does. Scholars have long
argued, however, that this alignment will seldom be more than partial. The
attorney is virtually guaranteed to face incentives that diverge from those of
the plaintiffs. In aggregate litigation, "the conflict of interest that is inherent
in all lawyer-client relationships becomes acute."3 6 The result of divergent
incentives and no effective supervision is a serious agency problem. This
problem can manifest in a multitude of ways, but three problems are
characteristic.37
First, even in the absence of agency costs, there is always a danger that
legal actions may be brought not in the hope of achieving a favorable
judgment on the merits, but rather to capture the nuisance value of the
lawsuits5 Even an entirely meritless claim is costly to defend. Defendants may,
competent and zealous, or to align the interests of the attorney with those of the class or
corporation."); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. I183 (1982);
Weiss & Beckerman, supra note i1, at 2o60 (arguing that lead plaintiffs are often recruited by the
lawyers, rather than the other way around, and were often "poorly informed about the theories of
their cases, . . . totally ignorant of the facts, or... illiterate concerning financial matters").
34. See generally Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structureof Stockholder Litigation: When
Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 841 (2014).
35. Macey & Miller, supranote 5, at 3 ("[P]laintiffs' class and derivative attorneys function
essentially as entrepreneurs who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise
nearly plenary control over all important decisions in the lawsuit.").
36. Alexander, supranote 15, at 535.
37. In a recent article, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch listed, and provided examples of, six
"situations in which an attorney's interests might diverge from her client's [leading to]
questionable practices." Burch, supra note 9, at 1292. The six she lists are: (I) "Quick Settlement
Sell-Outs;" (2) "Collusive Settlements;" (3) "Underfunded Litigation;" (4) "Astronomical Fees;"
(5) "Cram-Sown Settlement Practices;" and (6) "Misallocation of Settlement Funds." Id. at
1293-98. We focus here on the difficulties we believe to be most salient in class litigation, but do
not mean to suggest that we disagree with her discussion of other difficulties that may arise.
38. Defining whether a lawsuit is "frivolous" or not "socially desirable" is a more fraught
question than it may seem at first glance. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA.
L. REV. 519, 529-33 (1997) (considering and rejecting a number of common definitions of
"frivolous" litigation). For most purposes, however, we can consider a suit nonfrivolous where the
expected benefits to the plaintiffs from a trial exceed the expected costs of litigation. Given,
however, that litigation may generate externalities, even lawsuits not meeting this definition can
be socially desirable if, in addition to compensating the particular plaintiffs, they provide some
public benefit, such as deterrence of wrongdoing. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private
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if they are risk-averse or face high litigation costs, find it more economical to
settle claims even when they view them as meritless. 39Aggregate litigation may
increase the profitability of nuisance claims by increasing asymmetries
between plaintiff and defendant litigation costs and creating the possibilityeven if only remote-of catastrophic damages. In stockholder litigation,
attorney control of the litigation may increase the attractiveness of nuisance
suits, as the plaintiffs' attorney will lack any ongoing interest in the firm, and
thus lack an incentive to avoid value-destroying suits.
The second problem is the flip-side of the first. As risk-averse economic
actors who bear the costs of litigation, including the opportunity costs of their
time and effort, plaintiffs' attorneys may be tempted to settle meritorious
cases for too little. As Cox and Thomas have observed, "a settlement offer that
provided recovery of the attorney's tangible and opportunity costs could loom
larger than the prospect of aggressively pursuing the action to a more
lucrative prospectivejudgment or settlement."40 In fact, almost all class actions
and derivative suits are settled before trial-even more so than in other types
of litigation.41
The final problem-which exacerbates the second-is that the plaintiffs'
attorneys may abuse their control to maximize the portion of the value of a

Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working 42 MD. L. REV. 2 15,
218 (1983) ("The conventional theory of the private attorney general stresses that the role of
private litigation is not simply to secure compensation for victims, but is at least equally to
generate deterrence, principally by multiplying the total resources committed to the detection
and prosecution of the prohibited behavior."); Romano, supra note 17, at 85. Conversely, if
lawsuits merely consume resources and redistribute wealth without producing desirable incentive
effects, they may be socially undesirable even when the benefits to plaintiffs exceed the costs. See,
e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 61 1, 639-40 (1985); Donald C. Langevoort, CappingDamagesfor Open-MarketSecuritiesFraud,
38 AluZ. L. REV. 639, 646 (1996) (arguing that a goal of full compensation would lead to socially
undesirable results).
39. AsJanet Cooper Alexander summarized the economic arguments, "high litigation costs
and uncertainty about trial outcomes can lead to the settlement of frivolous suits." Alexander,
supra note 15, at 502 n.1o; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer,
17J. LEGALSTUD. 437, 437-48 (1988); Coffee, supranote 38, at 271-72;Jill E. Fisch, ClassAction
Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 533-59 (1997); D. Rosenberg & S.
Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3,
3-10 (1985).
Cox et al., supranote 33, at 1593; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 17-18 ("Yet
40.
the contingent fee also gives the attorney an incentive to pay insufficient attention to cases where
the marginal return to the attorney's time is low relative to other cases in the attorney's portfolio,
and to settle early for a lower amount than the attorney could obtain for the client by putting
more time and effort into the case."); id. at 22 ("Plaintiffs' attorneys may also wish to settle for a
relatively low sum on the eve of trial, knowing that in so doing they obtain most of the benefits
they can expect from the litigation while eliminating their downside risk.").
41. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, oo IOWA L. REV. 465, 477-80 (2015); Quinn Curtis & Minor Myers,
Do the Merits Matter?EmpiricalEvidence on ShareholderSuits from Options BackdatingLitigation, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 291, 337-40 (2016).
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settlement going to the attorneys, at the expense of the actual plaintiffs. In
this, plaintiffs' attorneys are often abetted by the defendants, who typically
care only about the aggregate amount of the settlement and not its division
among the plaintiffs' attorneys and the plaintiffs.s Commentators have long

noted the prevalence of settlement agreements providing little or no tangible
recovery to plaintiffs, while providing generous attorneys' fees.43
Such settlements are pervasive in aggregate stockholder litigation. For
example, an influential study by Romano found that only about half of the
settlements in her sample of stockholder suits led to any monetary recovery
for shareholders at all, while over go% provided cash payments to the
plaintiffs' attorneys.44 Astonishingly, in 8% of the settlements, "the only relief
was attorneys' fees."45 A recent paper by Cain and Davidoff Solomon studying
stockholder suits challenging large merger transactions found that
approximately 87% of such challenges resulted in so-called "disclosure-only"
settlements, where stockholders received no cash at all.4 6 The disclosures
associated with these settlements are widely regarded to be of no real value to
stockholders.47 While the stockholders themselves received no financial
recovery, the average fee paid to plaintiffs' attorneys in such settlements was
more than $700,000.48
In sum, agency problems in aggregate litigation may cause plaintiffs'
attorneys to bring non-meritorious claims, to settle meritorious claims too
quickly and for too little recovery, and to structure settlements so as to favor
themselves over the actual plaintiffs.
C.

FIXING PROCEDURAL AGGREGATION WITH MORE PROCEDURE

The agency problems described above strike at the very heart of most
aggregate litigation, as currently practiced. It has generated an enormous
theoretical and empirical literature examining the extent of the problem. At

See Minor Myers, FixingMulti-Forum ShareholderLitigation, 20i4 U. ILL. L. REV. 467, 506.
43. Especially notorious are so-called "coupon" settlements in consumer class action. In
such settlements, the attorneys receive substantial cash fees while plaintiffs receive only coupons
of dubious value, such as discounts for purchasing additional products or services from the
defendant. See, e.g., In reCuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litig., 38 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
446, 449, 454-56 (D. Conn. 1983) (involving a consumer antitrust settlement giving class
members coupons entitling them to a 50% discount on future purchases from the defendants);
Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton, Coupon Settlements: The Emperor's Clothes of Class Actions, 18
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1343 (2005) ;Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,judicialRevierv of Class
Action Settlements, i J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 167 (2009).
44. Romano, supra note 17, at61.
45. Id.
46. Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 41, at 481.
47. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An
EmpiricalAnalysis and a ProposalforReform, gg TEx. L. REV. 557 (2015).
48. Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 41, at 479.
42.
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the same time, it has also spawned a multitude of policy reforms designed to
mitigate the agency costs of aggregate litigation.
Judges presiding over mass litigation could theoretically serve as a
constraint on the self-interest of the attorneys by aggressively policing
settlements.49 In practice, however, a busy judge is understandably reluctant
to reject a settlement that all parties before the court are pressing the court
to accept.5o Given the general judicial policy in favor of settlement,5' and the
understandable desire to clear potentially complex cases from overloaded
dockets, it would be surprising ifjudges were frequently rejecting settlement
agreements.5 2 And, in fact, they are not. As a result, the vast majority of
aggregate claims are settled on terms set by conflicted parties, with little
meaningful oversight by either the class or the court.
The reform proposals that have had the most real-world impact focus on
the role of the plaintiffs themselves. The basic problem is that the plaintiffs
usually have little incentive or ability to effectively monitor the plaintiffs'
attorneys. In a large class, it will generally be the case that no individual
plaintiff will be willing to expend substantial resources monitoring the
attorneys, because the individual would bear all the costs of doing so, but
would receive only a (small) pro rata share of the benefits of any increased

&

49. SeeFED. R. CIv. P. 23(e) (1) ("[Al class [action] may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or
compromised only with the court's approval. . . . The court must direct notice in a reasonable
manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal."); id. R. 23.1(c) ("A derivative
action may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court's approval.
Notice . .. must be given to shareholders or members in the manner that the court orders.").
50. AsJudge Henry Friendly remarked, " [o]nce a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the
plaintiff stockholders link arms with their former adversaries to defend [their] joint handiwork."
Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327,347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly,J., dissenting); see also Cox
et al., supra note 33, at 1594 ("[T]he presiding judge, overwhelmed by a crowded docket and
poorly armed against the possible self-interest of the attorneys who promoted the suit's
settlement, was not capable of effectively protecting the interests of the class." (footnote
omitted)). It should be noted that while Cox and Thomas describe the agency problem in
shareholder litigation, they exhibit some skepticism as to the conclusion that courts are illequipped to deal with it. SeeJames D. Cox, Making SecuritiesFraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARiz.
L. REV. 497, 523-24 (1997) (arguing that even before the PSLRA, courts have had the power to
sanction frivolous suits and select appropriate lead plaintiffs).
See, e.g., In reHealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 572 F-3 d 854, 862 (11th Cir. 2009) ("Public
51.
policy strongly favors the pretrial settlement of class action lawsuits." (quoting In re U.S. Oil
Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 493 (11 th Cir. 1992))); Macedonia Church v. Lancaster Hotel, LP, No.
05-0153 (TLM), 2011 WL 2360138, at *9 (D. Conn. June 9, 201 1) ("Federal courts strongly
favor and encourage settlements, particularly in class actions and other complex matters, where
the inherent costs, delays, and risks of continued litigation might otherwise overwhelm any
potential benefit the class could hope to obtain."); 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 31, § 11:41
("The compromise of complex litigation is encouraged by the courts and favored by public policy.").
See Macey & Miller, supranote 5, at 45-46 (arguing that judges have little incentive to
52.
heavily police settlement agreements).
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recovery.53 Indeed, apart from the lead plaintiff-who in practice is usually
selected by the attorney, rather than the other way around-other class
members may not even be aware that litigation is pending, let alone
sufficiently informed to provide effective monitoring and guidance.54
In 1995, Weiss and Beckerman offered an ambitious proposal to address
dysfunction in federal securities litigation by prioritizing institutional
investors and others with large holdings who could, in theory, serve as
effective monitors in disputes for lead plaintiff status.55 Their proposal
provided the basis for important parts of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act ("PSLRA").56 Among other reforms, the PSLRA created a
presumption that the largest stockholder should serve as lead plaintiff in
securities class actions, on the theory that larger shareholders will have greater
incentive and ability to monitor the performance of plaintiffs' attorneys.57
Similarly, Delaware's rules for selecting a lead plaintiff in stockholder
litigation are sensitive to the size of the plaintiff's holdings>S This approach
capitalizes on variation among the plaintiff class-both in the exposure to the
harm and in the sophistication of the claimants-which makes it uniquely

See id. at 20 ("[C]ollective action and free-rider effects allow the plaintiffs' attorney in
53.
class and derivative cases to operate with nearly total freedom from traditional forms of client
monitoring.").
54. If plaintiffs typically hired the attorney, rather than the other way around, the need to
maintain a reputation for faithful performance might serve as an effective constraint on attorney
opportunism. The fact that lead plaintiffs are typically selected by the attorneys reduces the value
of reputational bonding as a mechanism for controlling agency costs. See id. at 21 ("The lack of
client monitoring in the class and derivative context also reduces the efficacy of reputational
bonding....").
55. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note t1, at 2058 (proposing "new practices, consistent with
current procedural rules, that courts could adopt to encourage institutional investors to become
lead plaintiffs"). Congress adopted this approach in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § I ot (a)-(b),
og Stat. 737, 738-40, 743-45 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. H§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2012)); Elliott
J. Weiss, The Lead PlaintiffProvisions of the PSLRA After a Decade, or "Look What's Happened to My
Baby, "61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 544 (2oo8).
56. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (B) (iii); see also Choi, supra note 17, at 1475 ("The PSLRA
imposes a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff, among those seeking to become the lead
plaintiff, who has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class and is otherwise an
adequate representative of the class is presumptively the lead plaintiff."); id. ("In theory, a lead
plaintiff with a large stake in the litigation will have more incentive to monitor the plaintiffs'
attorney's effort and also be more willing to resist excessive plaintiffs' attorney fee awards."); Cox
et al., supra note 33, at 1596 ("The theory behind [the lead plaintiff provision] was that
institutions with the largest losses would have the most to gain from becoming better monitors of
the conduct of the litigation."); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note i, at 2111.
58. See, e.g., TCW Tech. Ltd. P'ship v. Intermedia Commc'ns, Inc., No. 18336, 18289,
18293, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000) (employing a lead plaintiff standard
similar to that of the PSLRA).
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suitable to corporate and securities suits but unsuitable to consumer class
actions or mass torts.59
Empirical evaluations of the PSLRA have yielded equivocal results.

6o

Institutions appeared to take on the enhanced role that the PSLRA envisioned
for them, scrutinizing potential counsel and negotiating lower fees.6 , But the
evidence is decidedly mixed on whether institutions have had any effect on
recoveries and attorneys' fees. Choi, Fisch, and Pritchard compared prePSLRA litigation to post-PSLRA litigation and found little evidence of
progress. 62 Private institutions were not associated with higher recoveries;
public institutions were associated with higher recoveries, but they were
unable to rule out the explanation that public institutions simply cherrypicked the best cases. On fees, they found no evidence that institutional
involvement correlated with lower fees.63 The more troubling finding in some
research is that the newly empowered institutions used their influence to
benefit not the shareholder class but themselves. Especially at public
institutions, the risk is that they squeeze campaign contributions from
plaintiffs' attorneys wishing to do be hired to represent the institution. 64 Thus,
the PSLRA reforms do not appear to have altered the basic nature of the
attorney-client relationship in securities class actions. 65
Another avenue for altering the operation of class actions is to improve
the incentives of class attorneys in a straightforward way, by allowing them to
capture more of the recovery, and perhaps even all of it. Fitzpatrick has
provocatively offered such a proposal in the context of small-stakes class
actions, where the policy goal is chiefly to deter malfeasance. 66 For this reason,
class members would suffer no meaningful loss in compensation and would
benefit from the increased deterrence.6 7 Fitzpatrick argues that courts should
award to plaintiffs attorneys' considerably more of the recovery than they

Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluatingthe Selection of Class Counsel by Auction,
REV. 650, 725-27 (2002).
6o. SeeCox et al., supra note 33, at 1596; Korsmo &Myers, supra note 34; Weiss & Beckerman,
supranote 11,at 2111.
61. See Fisch, supranote 59, at 703-10 (describing the sophistication of counsel selection
by institutional investors).
62. StephenJ. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead PlaintiffProvisionof the
PrivateSecurities LitigationReform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 902-03 (2005).
63. Id. at o3.
64. See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPHRCAL
LEGAL STUD. 650 (2011). But see David H. Webber, Is "Pay-to-Play"Driving Public Pension Fund
Activism in Securities Class Actions?: An EmpiricalStudy, go B.U. L. REV. 2031 (20 o).
65. The muted impact of lead plaintiff-selection reforms may stem from the fact that courts
have always had the ability to select sensible lead plaintiffs and perhaps were already doing as well
59.

102 COLUM. L.

as possible. See Cox, supranote 50, at 523-24.

66.

See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043,

2083 (2010).
Id. at 2069 ("[S]mall-stakes class actions serve only a deterrence function . .

.

67.
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currently do, and in his view the optimal award is ioo% of the recovery.68 By
consolidating exposure to the claims in the plaintiffs' attorney, Fitzpatrick's
proposal can achieve many of the same goals as the aggregation by acquisition
proposal we develop below. Placing the claims in the hands of the party who
places the highest valuation on them, however, is a considerable challenge for
such a proposal because it does not rely on any pricing mechanisms. Another
obvious drawback of the proposal is that it holds out little hope when the
compensation of injured parties is an independent policy goal.
The most ambitious proposal-and one that, like ours, is motivated by a
desire to inject market forces into claim aggregation-comes from Macey and
Miller, 69 who proposed severing plaintiffs from the process entirely. They
would subject mass litigation to "some form of auction for plaintiffs' claims,
under which attorneys (and others) could bid for the right to bring the
litigation and gain the benefits, if any, that flow from success."7o This would
"overcome the agency costs that plague class and derivative litigation in its
current guise" because the winning bidder would act only on its own behalf,
bearing all of the costs and the benefits of litigation.?' The Macey and Miller
proposal shares our ambition of providing more effective deterrence through
private enforcement and delivering faster relief to those injured.
In theory, auctions-unlike a PSLRA-style approach-would work in any
type of aggregate litigation. The difficulties associated with auctions are
especially relevant to aggregation by acquisition, so we lay them out here in
some detail.
A threshold obstacle to auctioning aggregate claims is the same
information asymmetry that plagues litigation generally. Potential bidders will
not be in a good position to value the claims because they will not necessarily
know enough about potential liability and damages.72 For this reason, Macey
and Miller suggest some initial round of judicially supervised discovery.73
Moreover, the defendants, if allowed to bid, could further disrupt the auction
process, given their superior knowledge of the claim. A potential bidder might
worry that any bid that exceeded a defendant's bid would be an overpayment.
Their proposal also requires some first mover to file and frame the
complaint, who may then fail to prevail in the auction.74 Macey and Miller
68. Id. at 2o83 ("[T] here is little reason as a theoretical matter not to fully incentivize class
action lawyers to bring these suits by awarding them the entire class recovery. Although political
and perhaps even legal constraints might preventjudges from setting fee percentages at r oo% in
small-stakes cases, deterrence-insurance theory nonetheless suggests that judges ought to give
class counsel as much as they can, which, by any measure, is more than the 25% they usually give now.").
69. Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 4.
70. Id. at 6.
Id. at io8.
71.
See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 20, at 44973. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits: A
Rejoinder, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 458, 467 (1993).
72.

74.

See Coffee, supra note 33, at 691-94.
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propose that the first mover be compensated through some quantum meruit
award to ensure the continued existence of some incentive to research and
file claims.75

In addition, it would be difficult to ensure the cooperation of class
members who have no ongoing interest in the case. Macey and Miller raise
the idea of requiring class members to submit some proof of claim that the
victorious bidder could use to demonstrate damages or subpoenaing class
members to testify.7 6 They suggest that courts may "need to develop innovative

procedures for dealing with these difficulties."77 This difficulty, however, cuts
deep; few bidders would be willing to invest substantial resources in the claim
if the damages claim might crumble based on the non-participation of class
members.
Financing is another potentially severe problem with the Macey and
Miller proposal, as they acknowledge.78 Their general proposal envisions an
auction and purchase of the entire aggregate claim, but for large claims there
may not be a deep market of potential buyers. For this reason, they also
contemplate an auction of a portion of the claim. In particular, they suggest
that an auction of the right to serve as lead counsel might be a useful half-step
short of complete sale. A number of courts have prominently experimented
with this approach. In the Oracle securities litigation,79 for example, Judge
Vaughn Walker had prospective counsel submit bids on what fee they would
take as a percentage of the class recovery, and the winning lead counsel was
bound by its winning bid.8o This process, in judge Walker's view, "adequately
simulated the market for legal services." 8' Other judges have experimented
with similar mechanisms.82 While the auction of the lead counsel role has had
successes,1 it has attracted sustained criticism in the literature and has failed
to generate any momentum in trial courts.84
III. THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF LEGAL CLAIMS

Our proposal-a full market for legal claims, where the purchasers stand
in the shoes of the original party to the claim and control the litigation-

75.

See Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 1 14-15.

76.
77.

Id.

78.

Id. at 113 ("[F]inancing remainsa potentially serious problem for the largest claims.").

79.
8o.
81.
82.

In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal. i9go).
Id.
In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
In reAuction Houses Antitrust Litig., 197 F.R.D. 71, 78-80 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (identifying

Id. at 114.

courts that have employed legal counsel auctions).
83.

In Auction House, Judge Kaplan observed "that the result of the lead counsel auction in

this case was exceptionally beneficial to the class." In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. oo
Civ. o648 (LAK), 2oo1 WL 170792, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001).
84. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 59, at 651-53.
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presupposes that legal claims can be bought and sold. Given the importance
of such transactions to our proposal, this Part examines the alienability of
legal claims. It outlines the historic prohibitions on buying legal claims and
the more recent trend-from contingency fees to litigation finance-that has
resulted in a rudimentary market in legal claims.
A.

HISTORIC PROHIBITIONS ON SALE OFLEGAL CLAIMS

The purchase and salc of legal claims has historically been sharply limited
by laws restricting champerty, maintenance, and barratry. Roughly speaking,
"barratry" refers to a third party stirring up a lawsuit among others, 85
"maintenance" refers to a third party financially or otherwise supporting
another's lawsuit,86 and "champerty" refers to maintenance in which the third
party receives a portion of the spoils. 8 7

In common law countries, bars on these practices originated in the
medieval era.8 8 Traditionally, these bans have been understood as measures
intended to prevent "great men" from using their influence over the courts as
a method of harassing rivals and oppressing the weak. 89
If these bans ever served these purposes, however,9o they no longer do so
today.91 Instead, their principal effect is to prevent capital-poor parties or

85.

Blackstone defined "barratry" as "frequently exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels."

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.

86. Blackstone defined "maintenance" as "an officious intermeddling in a suit that [in] no
way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to
prosecute or defend it." Id. at *134-35.
87.

Id. at *135; see also Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform,

12 YALE J. ON REG. 435, 461 (1995) ("In short, barratry refers to stirring up a lawsuit,
maintenance involves supporting a lawsuit, and champerty means doing so in hopes of

profiting."); Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 6o-63 (1935).
88.
See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 85, at *134-36; EDWARD JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 142-43 (1912); see also 7 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 457
(1926) (discussing later statutes).
89. Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supra note 9, at 1287 ("What had happened was
that 'small men' transferred their rights of action in property disputes to 'great men' in order to
get the great men's support at law. Because the legal establishment was weak at the time, the great
men could overwhelm the court . . . ." (citations omitted)); see also Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3
Cow. 623, 644 (N.Y. 1824) (identifying a statute from the reign of Henry VIII "to repress the
practices of many who when they thought they had title or right to any land, for the furtherance
of their pretended right, conveyed their interest in some part thereof to great persons, and with
their countenance, did oppress the possessors").
go.
A cynic might suspect that the bans were always intended to protect entrenched interests
by blocking the only practical avenue for the non-wealthy to make effective use of the courts.
gi.
Thallhimer 3 Cow. at 645 (noting that bars on champerty are unnecessary where the
institutions of justice are strong, and courts are unlikely to be overawed by officious
intermeddlers); AnthonyJ. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 122 (2011) ("U.S.
courts have never been shy about admitting that the earliest justification for limitations on
assignment and champerty has almost no relevance to contemporary life.").
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holders of small claims from vigorously pursuing their claims.92 A number of
influential scholars have thus called for the abandonment of restrictions on
champerty and maintenance.93
Indeed, the general trend in modern law has been away from restrictions
on claim alienation, beginning with the legalization of contingency fees,
which were themselves once regarded as champertous.94 An increasing

number of states are explicitly rejecting old restrictions on champerty and
maintenance, particularly in business cases.95 Some states have even moved
toward full assignability of choses of action in personal injury cases.96
Nevertheless, these doctrines continue to exist in manyjurisdictions and pose
a serious obstacle to any alienation of legal claims.
B.

SETTLEMENT AND CONTINGENCYF1ES AS A SALE

In spite of these historic obstacles, claim alienation in two forms is already
perfectly routine in the United States. When a plaintiff settles her claim, the
result is indistinguishable from simply selling the claim to the defendant.97

92.
See Molot, supra note 6, at i o6 ("The principal purpose of champerty and maintenance
restrictions is to prevent financiers from fomenting litigation-that is, from inducing plaintiffs to
bring lawsuits that they otherwise would not file or to pursue lawsuits with greater vigor. But that
is precisely the point of reform: when plaintiffs lack the cash or risk tolerance to pursue meritorious
claims, we want to induce them to file suit and pursue their claims vigorously." (footnotes
omitted)); Radin, supra note 87, at 66 ("In most instances, the modern objections to champerty
are voiced by the more successful members of the [bar] and on behalf of propertied defendants.").
93. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 87, at lo5-og; Sebok, supra note 91, at 133 (arguing for the
"desirability of liberal rules concerning assignment and maintenance"); Steinitz, Whose Claim Is
This Anyway?, supra note 9, at 1327 ("[E]limination of the champerty prohibition, at least as it
relates to the litigation-funding context, will increase access to justice and equal participation in
the judicial process.").
94. See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 232-49 (1998) (tracing the
evolving judicial treatment of contingency fees).
95. See Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 201 1) (noting a
"consistent trend across the country [of] . . . limiting, not expanding, champerty's reach");
Jonathan T. Molot, The FeasibilityofLitigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171, 184 (2014) ("The common
law doctrines of champerty and maintenance, which long ago stood in the way of third-party
financing, have been abandoned in the vast majority of states, and even where the doctrines
continue to place restrictions on the financing of personal claims, they generally have no
application to business disputes." (footnotes omitted)); Sebok, supra note 91, at 98-99.
96. See Cain, supra note 9, at 22-23 (noting that nine states allow full assignment of personal
injury claims, eight states allow assignment of the proceeds but not the claim itself, and 29 states
prohibit assignment of either); Sebok, supra note 91, at 72 (noting that the early common law
barred assignment of personal claims to a third party).
97. See Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability ofLegal Claims, s4 YALE L.J. 697, 710 (2005)
(likening settlement to "alienation of a plaintiffs claim to the defendant"); Choharis, supra note
87, at 469 (same).
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8
This type of sale is comparatively uncontroversial,9 but of course the obvious
drawback is that there is only one potential buyer-the defendant.99
Similarly, when a plaintiff retains an attorney on a contingency fee basis,
she essentially sells a portion of her claim-typically a quarter to a third of itto the attorney. 00 Again, one drawback is that that the potential market is
limited to a legal cartel of plaintiffs' attorneys who are limited in their ability
to fully diversify.1ol Another is that the purchase price is primarily paid in kind,
in the form of legal services, reducing the ability of the plaintiff to receive
prompt compensation to cover living expenses. The receipt of payment in
kind also hampers the ability of parties to "price-shop," as plaintiffs' attorneys
compete largely on quality, which is far less easily observed than price.o The
difficulty of comparing pricing and quality is made even more difficult by the
fact that plaintiffs' attorneys are generally providing a bundled set of
undifferentiated services, including legal services and financing of the
litigation itself.103 By contrast, a full market for legal claims would allow nonlaw firms and counterparties to bid for claims. Dedicated purchasers of legal
claims would be able to employ greater capital resources and engage in more
thorough diversification than is generally possible for law firms, who are
limited in the number of cases they can effectively take on at any given time. -4

g8. But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Many of Fiss's
objections to settlement can be characterized as problems caused by the lack of alternative buyers.
99. See Abramowicz, supra note 97, at '70 (suggesting that "affording the opposing litigant a
monopoly on claim alienation might be worse for personhood than allowing a free market in
alienation"); Ronen Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third-PartyLitigation Funding-A Signaling
Mode4 63 DEPAUL L. REv. 233, 235 (2014) (noting "the monopsony power that defendants have visA-vis plaintiffs' ability to sell their claim (i.e., to settle)"); Choharis, supranote 87, at 469 (noting that
"the law gives the tortfeasor the exclusive right to buy the injured party's entire claim").
1oo. See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 91, at 99 ("Technically, of course, all fifty-one jurisdictions
permit at least one form of maintenance: the contingency fee.").
101. SeeMichael I. Krauss, Alternate DisputeFinancingand LegalEthics:Freethe Lauyers!, 32 MISS.
C. L. REV. 247, 253 (2013) (noting that contingency fees give lawyers "a monopsonic right to
purchase shares in cases . .. leading to monopoly 'rents'").
102.

See Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price

Competitive?, 25 CARDozo L.

REV. 65, 93-97

(2003) (concluding that the contingent fee market

is not price competitive, in part due to the difficulty of distinguishing between a lawyer who is
cheap because he is efficient and one who is cheap because he is bad).
103.

A recent paper by Baker explored the ideal of complete alienation of claims to attorneys

and concluded such a regime was desirable. Baker, supra note 8, at 302 ("This Article has embarked
on a thought experiment: What would the likely effects on claimants and plaintiffs' attorneys be if
an injured person had the option to sell her entire claim to a law firm rather than retaining the firm
to represent her on a contingent fee basis? An analysis of the costs and benefits reveals that both
groups would be expected to prefer such a regime to the current state of affairs.").
See Choharis, supra note 87, at 476 (noting that "in order to invest [labor] in many
104.
lawsuits, plaintiffs' law firms would have to be huge"); Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a
Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Marketfor Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 625, 678-80
(1995)

(noting the ability of lawyers to hold a portfolio of cases and the difficulty in achieving

adequate diversification).
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For some types of legal claims, actual market sale is already common. For
example, contract claims can often be assigned from one party to another.os
A company's rights to pursue claims are frequently transferred to a successor
company by merger..o 6 Legal claims are routinely transferred along with the
sale of both tangible and intangible property like real estate or patents. 0 7
Claims of all types often change hands via bankruptcy. Even the right to
pursue claims arising from personal injury-otherwise the quintessential
"personal" claim-can effectively be transferred to an insurance company via
subrogation or assignment.,os Viewed in the light of all these "exceptions" to
the inalienability of legal claims, it is the "rule" itself that begins to appear
anomalous.
C.

THE RISE OFLITIGATIONFINANCE

Litigation finance is the funding of litigation by a third party with no
other connection to the underlying litigation.o9 Notably, the litigation

financier is someone other than the attorneys, distinguishing litigation
finance from a traditional contingency fee arrangement,. This phenomenon,
which has attracted increasing attention recently in the marketplace and in
scholarship, in some ways represents the seed of a market for legal claims.o
An early form of litigation finance in the United States is the so-called
"litigation lending" or "cash advance" industry."' Litigation lenders105.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs

§ 317

(AM. LAW INST. 1981).

so6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (West 2006) (providing that "all the rights,
privileges, powers and franchises" transfer to the surviving or resulting firm following a merger);
S. Michael Sirkin, Standing at the Singularity of the Effective Time: Reconfiguring Delaware's Law of
Standing Following Mergers and Acquisitions, 69 BUS. LAW. 429, 451 (2014) (noting that "[t]his
includes legal claims").
See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in
107.
Intellectual Property Law, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1323, 1336 (2000) ("The original Patent Act of 1790
contemplated that patent owners could assign their rights, and that in such instances the assignee
would have standing to sue for patent infringement.").
1o8. See Sebok, Should the Law Preserve Party Control?, supra note 9, at 871 (explaining
subrogation in the insurance context).
og. Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway ?, supra note 9, at 1276 (defining litigation finance
as "the provision of funds by companies who have no other connection with the litigation").
Ito. A list of notable contributions to the litigation finance literature is given above at supra
note g. In addition, a number of earlier articles have discussed more generally the practicability
and desirability of some form of market for legal claims. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 97;
Choharis, supranote 87; Cooter, supra note 12; Macey & Miller, supra note 5.
III. Molot, supra note 6, at 93 (noting that "[o]ver the last decade or so, a relatively new
'cash advance' industry has developed"); Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supra note 9, at
1277 (referring to litigation lending as "first-wave litigation funding"). See generally Andrew
Hananel & David Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the Post-Rancman Era, 17 GEO.J. LEGAL
ETHICS 795 (2004); Susan Lorde Martin, FinancingLitigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1
DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 85 (2002); Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An
IncreasinglyPopular(and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 57 (1999-2000); Susan Lorde
Martin, Litigation Financing:Another Sulprime Industry That Has a Place in the United States Market,
53 VILL. L. REv. 83 (2008) [hereinafter Martin, Litigation Financing]; Susan Lorde Martin, The
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contingency fee lawyers-12 -provide individual

personal injury plaintiffs with cash advances that can be used both to fund
litigation and to finance the plaintiffs personal expenses while their suit is
pending. The cash advance is a loan charging a fixed interest rate that is
usually pegged at a very high level."3 To avoid running afoul of usury laws,
the advances are mostly structured as non-recourse loans where the plaintiff
is only obliged to pay back the lender out of the proceeds of the pending
lawsuit."4 The litigation lender plays no active role in litigation. However, the
non-recourse nature of the loan means that the lender must feel comfortable
that the claim will result in a sufficient recovery to pay back the funds
advanced.
Due to the high rates charged, and the often vulnerable and
unsophisticated nature of its customers, litigation lending has been criticized
as a form of predatory lending." While some jurisdictions have given their
blessing to litigation lending in one form or another," 6 several states have
taken or considered steps to limit litigation lending or place caps on the fees
and rates charged."7 Nonetheless, litigation lending does arguably assist in
the funding of claims that might otherwise not be able to be maintained. Like
other forms of subprime lending, litigation finance provides credit to parties
who would otherwise lack access to it, allowing plaintiffs to finance their living
expenses by moving some of the expected future value of a claim forward in

Litigation FinancingIndustry: The Wild West ofFinance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 1o FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L- 55 (2004) [hereinafter Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry]; Julia H.
McLaughlin, LitigationFunding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615 (2007);
Rodak, supra note 9.
See Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway, supra note 9, at 1277 (noting that litigation
112.
lenders are "often relatively small operations set up by former contingency fee lawyers who
recognized the demand for such lending services").
113. See Molot, supra note 6, at 93 (noting "the very high interest rates charged by cash
advance firms-typically 3% to 5% monthly interest, and often much higher").
Id.; see alsoKalajdzic et al., supra note 9, at 129 ("The nonrecourse character of the loans
114.
allows the circumvention of usury laws, which bar ultra-high interest loans.").
See Steinitz, Whose ClaimIs This Anyway?, supra note 9, at 1277 (suggesting that litigation
115.
lenders "oftentimes engaged in predatory lending"). Molot has also suggested that the high rates
charged by litigation lenders might distort litigation outcomes by increasing the pressure on the
plaintiff to settle quickly to get out from under a loan. Molot, supra note 6, at 93-94.
116. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349-55 (West Supp. 2015). A minority of states apply
usury laws even to non-recourse loans, thus sharply limiting the ability of litigation lenders to
operate. See, e.g., Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 779 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Kalajdzic
et al., supra note 9, at 129 n.150.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-57-1o (Supp. 2015) (applying usury laws with a maximum rate
117.
of 17%-as stated in § 4-57-lo4 and ARK CONST. amend. 89, § 3-to litigation lenders and requiring
various disclosures). See generally JOHN H. BEISNER & GARY A. RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, STOPPING THE SALE ON LAwsuITs: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENTS IN
LITIGATION (2012), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/i/TPLF.Solutions.pdf
(proposing increased oversight for litigation lenders).
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time." 8 An injured party facing emergency medical or other expenses may
rationally have an extremely high discount rate, making attractive even the
high rates charged by litigation lenders."9
More recently, in what Steinitz has referred to as "second-wave litigation
funding,"so specialized investment funds have begun investing directly in
litigation. In contrast to the relatively numerous litigation lenders, thus far
only around two dozen litigation finance firms are in operation in the United
States.,2I Among the largest and most prominent arejuridica Investments and
Burford Capital, each of which manage portfolios in the hundreds of millions
of dollars, and both of which are publicly traded on the London Stock

Exchange.'12
While litigation finance companies typically keep the details of their
arrangements confidential, the basic structure has been for the finance
company to approach individual plaintiffs or plaintiffs' firms who have
pending litigation that is of potential interest. They offer to provide funds to
2
finance the litigation in exchange for a percentage of the ultimate recovery.' 3
Depending on the amount of financing provided and the litigation funder's
estimate of the potential recovery, the contingency fee can range from quite
low up to as high as fifty percent, usually capped at some multiple of the
amount of funding provided. Obviously, "pricing" the investment properlyin terms of setting the size of the contingency fee appropriately-depends on
the funder's ability to accurately assess the expected ultimate recovery.
D.

THE LIMITED PROMISE OFLITIGATIONFINANCEFORAGGREGATE CLAIMS

The rise of litigation finance holds out little promise as a means to
address the agency problem in aggregate litigation. In the U.S., litigation
finance has almost exclusively involved funding of plaintiffs and their
attorneys.' 2 4 The claims financed are rarely personal injury claims, but rather

1 18. See Martin, Litigation Financing, supra note 1 1, at 87; Martin, The Litigation Financing
Industry, supranote 1 1 1, at 74-75.
119. See Abramowicz, supra note 97, at 736 (explaining that "(s]ome tort plaintiffs face
liquidity problems, particularly if they face unexpected bills attributable to the tort, such as
medical expenses," and thus may have abnormally high discount rates).
120.
Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supranote 9, at 1277.
121.
See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 9, at 130 ("Reports put the number of major litigation
lenders in the United States at roughly 19.").
Id.
122.
123.
See id. at ioo; Molot, supra note 95, at 178-8 1; Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract,
supra note 9, at 48o.
124. Some litigation finance firms have expressed interest in financing defense-side
litigation, essentially providing a form of post-claim liability insurance. See Deborah R. Hensler,
The Future of Mass Litigation:Global Class Actions and Third-Paty Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 3o6, 322 (201 1); Kalajdzic et al., supra note 9, at 132 ("With very few exceptions, litigation
funders support primarily plaintiff-side efforts, although some lenders have expressed interest in
expanding their funding to defendants and their lawyers as well."); Ralph Lindeman, Third-Party
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large commercial claims between corporations, including price-fixing cases,
patent litigation, and contract disputes. 5
Third-party financiers have to date been involved in very few aggregate
claims of any kind." 6 More importantly, there appear to be no cases involving
third-party financing of class actions or derivative claims.127 Some of the
largest litigation finance firms have disclaimed any intention to fund class
actions. 28

This reluctance to invest in class actions likely stems from several
considerations. First, class actions may simply be viewed as less predictable and
more risky than the commercial claims that are currently the focus of
litigation funding activity. Second, given the availability of the class action
mechanism, litigation funders-who would likely need to secure the
affirmative assent of individual plaintiffs to any fee agreement-operate at a
serious disadvantage against plaintiffs' lawyers who can use the class
mechanism to impose a contingency fee on the entire class on an opt-out
basis. While litigation finance firms could conceivably contract directly with
plaintiffs' firms to take on the costs of litigation, the need for class counsel to
depend on outside financing may interfere with the ability to be appointed
lead counsel in the first place.29
The rather limited market for litigation finance in the United States
stands in contrast to the more developed markets in Australia and, to a lesser
extent, England. In Australia, a handful of large-relative to the Australian
market-litigation finance firms invest in a wide variety of cases, including
class claims.13o Indeed, the largest Australian litigation finance firms now
concentrate the bulk of their efforts on securities class actions and other class
claims.'3' As in the United States, financing deals typically involve the

Investors Offer New FundingSourcefor Major CommercialLawsuits, BNA: Daily Reports for Executives,
Mar. 5, 2010.
125.

Kalajdzic et al., supranote 9, at 132-33.
126. Two exceptions are the World Trade Center Respiratory Illness lawsuit, which involved a
litigation finance firm providing a loan to the plaintiffs' law firm to cover litigation expenses, and
the controversial funding of a suit in Ecuador against Chevron involving environmental
despoliation. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2oo), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/1 5 /business/15lawsuit.html; Roger Parloff,
Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit', FORTUNE (June 28, 2011, 6:o6 PM), http://fortune.com/
201 /o6/28/have-you-got-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit-2.
127.
See Hensler, supra note 124, at 323; Kalajdzic et al., supra note 9, at 133.
Hensler, supra note 124, at 323; Kalajdzic et al., supra note 9, at 133; see, e.g., Our Public
128.
Policy Statement: PioneeringCorporate Claim Financefor CommercialLitigation,JURIDICA, http://www.
juidicainvestments.com/about-juridica/our-public-policy-statement.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
129.
See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 9, at 133-34 ("[I]n the context of lawyers wrangling to
represent the class, the inability of class counsel to self-fund may prove fatal to lead counsel status.").

130. For a more comprehensive overview of litigation finance in Australia, see id. at 96-113.
131. Id. at 97 ("In pure dollars, the bulk of commercial funding in Australia is now
concentrated in class action litigation.").
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litigation finance firm agreeing to pay the costs of litigation in exchange for a
percentage of the recovery.1s 2
The Australian and English examples may be misleading, though. They
do not represent the future of American litigation finance so much as they
reveal adaptive responses to the different legal rules in those countries
surrounding the prosecution of aggregate claims. Perhaps most importantly,
while contingency fees are the dominant form of compensation for plaintiffs'
attorneys in the United States, contingency fees are forbidden in most cases
in Australia and most of Europe.ss As a result, plaintiffs' firms are unlikely to
be willing and able to self-finance, and class claims face formidable collective
action problems in raising sufficient funds to pay by the hour. In addition, in
contrast to the "American Rule," whereby each party bears its own legal
expenses, these jurisdictions apply the "English Rule," requiring the losing
party to reimburse the legal expenses of the winning party.134 The English
Rule greatly amplifies the risk of an unsuccessful suit, particularly in a class
claim where the lead plaintiff bears all of the risk of an adverse costs
allocation, but only a pro rata share of any recovery.'35 A litigation finance
firm, by investing in a portfolio of cases, is able to diversify away the additional
risk caused by the English Rule.
Not only do Australian and English litigation finance firms routinely
invest in class actions, but in Australia it is common for the funder to exercise
substantial control over the selection of the attorneys and the conduct of the
litigation.s 6 In a pair of landmark cases, the Australian High Court explicitly
blessed a funding agreement where the funder bore the costs of the
proceeding in exchange for 33% of the recovery, and also retained the ability
to select the attorney, conduct the proceedings, and even settle the claims.'37

Id. at oo (noting that the fee "is commonly in the range 25-40% with escalation within
132.
this range depending on the time taken and/or whether there are appeals").
SeeWinand Emons & Nuno Garoupa, US-Style ContingentFees and UK-Style ConditionalFees:
133.
Agency Problems and the Supply of Legal Services, 27 MANAGERIAL & DECISION EcoN. 379 (2oo6)

(discussing the ban on contingent legal fees in Europe); Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?,
supra note 9, at 1278-79 n.23 (tying the development of litigation finance in Australia and the
U.K. to the fact that "the legal availability of contingency fees .. . is much more limited" than in
the United States).
See Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supra note 9, at 1278 n.23 (noting that
134.
"developments in the United Kingdom and in Australia must be viewed in light of the fact that
both jurisdictions are governed by the so-called British rule which requires the losing party to pay
the winner's attorneys' fees"); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person'sAccess to justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1635-36 (1993) (expressing skepticism of
the English Rule's utility in the United States).
See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 9, at 98 ("Because a representative party is potentially
135.
liable for the costs of an unsuccessful action ... there is great financial disincentive to take on
the role of representative party.").
See id. at 147.
136.
See Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd v FostifPty Ltd (2oo6) 229 ALR 58, 66 (Austl.); Mobil
137.
Oil Austl Pty Ltd v Trendlen Pty Ltd (2oo6) 229 ALR 51, 52 (Austl.).
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The High Court emphasized the benefits of litigation finance and expressed
a reluctance to interfere with arrangements entered into by individuals of "full
age and capacity .. . untainted by infirmity."3a The English Court of Appeal
has also approved of litigation financing arrangements, though has suggested
that control must remain with the plaintiff in order to avoid limitations on
champerty. 19

American litigation financiers often explicitly disclaim any control over
the proceedings they finance.Jonathan Molot, a law professor at Georgetown
and co-founder of Burford Capital, described the firm as "a passive provider
of financing."4o He emphasizes that Burford "does not control litigation or
settlement decisions and does not interfere with the traditional
attorney-client relationship."'41 Of course, it is difficult to believe that the
party paying the bills has no influence, as a practical matter, and Molot
acknowledges that "clients and their lawyers rely on Burford to monitor cases
should there be a need for additional financing, and they often ask Burford
for input on major litigation decisions."42 Nonetheless, litigation funders in
the U.S. have a strong incentive to appear to leave control with the original
plaintiff in order to reduce the chances of running afoul of lingering
restrictions on champerty and maintenance.'43
Perhaps the most serious problem with litigation finance is that it creates
a new agency problem, compounding the existing attorney-client agency
problem. In place of the two-way relationship between lawyer and client,
litigation finance creates a three-way triangle of divergent incentives and
divided loyalties.144 Holding a portfolio of cases-which, as explained
Campbells, 229 ALR at 82.
138.
139. See Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 655 [40] (Eng.) ("Our approach
is designed to cater for the commercial funder who is financing part of the costs of the litigation
in a manner which facilitates access to justice and which is not otherwise objectionable. Such
funding will leave the claimant as the party primarily interested in the result of the litigation and
the party in control of the conduct of the litigation.").
140. Molot, supra note 95, at 178.
141. Id.
Id. at 178-79. Molot suggests that clients and attorneys solicit Burford's input because
142.
"they know that Burford has experienced litigators on staff and that Burford's financial interests
are aligned with those of the client," but one can also imagine that the parties have an incentive
to keep the party with the purse happy. Id. at 179; see also Kalajdzic et al., supra note 9, at 137
(noting that "it is difficult to imagine that in all cases of [third-party litigation financing] the
holder of the purse strings would have no influence over the handling of the litigation.").
See supra Part III.A.
143.
See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 9, at 724 (noting "divergent enforcement incentives");
144.
Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supra note 9, at 13 2 2 ("A second problem, which may offset
the potential positive effects of litigation finance, is the fragmentation of the triangular attorneyclient-funder relationship."); id. at 1324 ("While both attorneys and funders, as savvy repeat
players, have an interest in creating and preserving reputational gains, this interest may pull them
in different directions in any given litigation and may not be aligned with the client's interest in,
say, resolving a suit and moving on with her life."); id. at 1323 n. 195 ("Each of the three members
of the triangular relationship may have different views on which strategies should be employed
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below,145 holds out great promise for leveling bargaining disparities and
creating the ability to play for rules-also drives a wedge between the
incentives of the funder and the client in any individual case. The funder, for
example, might wish to take a high-risk position in one case in the hope that
it will lead to a legal rule change that will benefit the funder in future cases.
The original party, of course, would wish to simply maximize the expected
value of the case at hand. Similarly, the funder might decide it has a more
attractive case in which to invest its capital, and desire to settle an existing case
quickly, against the wishes of an original party who desires to hold out for full
value. The conflict of interest is likely to be made even more acute by the fact
that both the plaintiffs' lawyer and the funder are repeat players likely to have
an ongoing relationship.'4 6 As a result, each has an incentive to facilitate the
other even at the expense of the nominal client, who is more likely a one-shot
player. In particular, regardless of any formal obligation on the part of the
attorney to serve the client's interests, it is inevitable that attorneys will seek
to curry favor with the funder who is actually paying the bills.
The existing literature on litigation finance has devoted little attention
to the attorney-client agency problem or the possibility that litigation finance
might help to address the problem.'47 As Burch has noted, "neither
economists, ethicists, nor complex litigation scholars have considered
financing as a means for addressing the distorted lawyer-client relationship in
mass litigation."'4 8 In part, this is undoubtedly because of the scant attention
given to class and derivative litigation, where agency problems are at their
worst. While much of the descriptive and comparative work on litigation
finance discusses the use of financing in aggregate litigation in Australia and
the United Kingdom,'49 the theoretical literature has focused almost entirely
on the types of individual claims-generally commercial claims-that
dominate litigation finance in the United States. As noted above, litigation
finance is as likely to generate an agency problem as to solve one in these
contexts.
An exception to this neglect of the agency problem is the work of Burch
herself. In her recent article, Burch suggests that litigation funders may help

in the litigation, when and for how much to settle, whether the client can withdraw the lawsuit
altogether, and whether the client or funder gets to pick counsel." (citing VICKI WAYE, TRADING
IN LEGAL CLAIMs: LAw, POLICY & FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA, UK & US 222-26 (2008))).

145.
See infra Part IV.D.2, 4-5.
See Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supra note 9, at 13o6 n.140 (explaining that
146.
the Australian experience has revealed "a repeat play amongst funders and attorneys that then
further complicates the client's bargaining position within the triangular relationship").
147. One recent exception is Samuel Issacharoff, LitigationFundingand the Problem ofAgency
Cost in Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561, 582 (2014) (suggesting that litigation
funders would have incentives aligned with the class counsel and might be able to monitor then
so as to reduce agency costs).
148.
149.

Burch, supra note 9, at 1279.
See, e.g., WAYE, supranote 144; Kalajdzic et al., supra note 9.
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to reduce attorney-client agency costs by serving as an effective monitor of
plaintiffs' attorneys.o5 0 Financiers can pay attorneys by the hour and have the
kind of concentrated economic stake and repeat player expertise that will give
them the incentive and wherewithal to effectively monitor the course of the
litigation.151
As noted in Part II, the empirical evidence for the benefits of institutional
lead plaintiffs are equivocal. We suspect that litigation funders may likewise
fall short as monitors of class counsel, at least in terms of protecting the
interests of the plaintiff class. Thus, even if funders are, as seems likely,
wonderfully effective in controlling the conduct of the litigation, they will do
so in pursuit of their own interests, rather than those of the client.
IV. AGGREGATION BY ACQUISITION: OUR PROPOSED MARKET FOR LEGAL
CLAIMS

Given the pathologies of the class action, we propose an alternative
mechanism for aggregating small claims: allowing the purchase and sale of
legal rights. Would-be class members could sell their claims to buyers who
specialize in evaluating and pressing claims. Having accumulated a large
number of similar claims, the buyer could then press them on its own behalf.
By harnessing the power of market forces in service of mass claimants, our
proposal would offer a potent alternative to the class action and derivative suit
as a method for aggregating claims, and one that would better serve the
deterrence and compensation goals of aggregate litigation. This Part sets
forth the details of our proposal.
First, we introduce the concept of claim alienation; if it were fully allowed,
claims could be aggregated in several recurring contexts. Next, we show how
outright claim purchase would allow the aggregation and prosecution of
small, widely dispersed claims. Third, we explain how aggregation through
acquisition would avoid the agency problems inherent in traditional
procedural aggregation mechanisms. Finally, we provide a tangible example
of aggregation by acquisition in action in one of the few contexts where it is
currently possible: the corporate law statutory appraisal action.

150. See Burch, supra note 9, at 1280 ("If... transactions are structured according to this
Article's blueprint, [litigation funders] might likewise supply the oversight and attorney
monitoring that nonclass aggregation lacks."). Burch focuses on non-class aggregate litigation,
on the theory that class plaintiffs are already protected somewhat by monitoring by lead plaintiffs
and courts. Id. at 1276-78. As shown in Part II, this protection is often illusory, and many of
Burch's insights would apply with equal force in the class or derivative context.
151.

See id. at 1277.
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MARKET FOR LEGAL CLAIMS

Our proposal is simple: allow full alienability of matured legal claims.152
Following the sale of the claim, the purchaser would own the claim outright
and have full control over the proceedings. The seller would have no ongoing
authority over the claims and not need be involved in any further aspect of
their prosecution. Of course, the original holder might wish to sell only a
portion of the claim or might agree by contract to assist in the prosecution of
the claims by providing evidence in the litigation.
For individual claims-the sort that are not aggregated procedurally
under current law-the market would operate in much the same way as the
one that already exists for the small subset of claims that are already alienable.
For example, patent claims may be alienated by simply selling the patent, or
by assigning the patent to a corporation and selling shares to outside
investors. 53 Similarly, under our proposal an individual claim-be it personal
injury or otherwise-could be sold directly to an investor. Larger, riskier, or
more uncertain claims could be assigned to a corporation, with shares issued
to the purchaser (or purchasers, if multiple parties wish to spread the risk). 54
In a developed market, numerous diversified claims could be held by a single
corporation, with bonds or other securities issued backed by the future
proceeds of litigation, akin to the securitization of mortgages or other classes
of assets. '55
The situation would be somewhat more complicated for mass claims that
would presently be brought as class actions. Identifying potential claimants
and valuing their claims would obviously be more burdensome than in the
single-plaintiff scenario. Nonetheless, the difficulties should not be
insuperable. We envision the process as working similarly to the existing
procedures for class notice and proof of claims in class actions.'s 6 The wouldbe aggregator could send out solicitations to potential plaintiffs, including
forms designed to elicit the kinds of information that would be filed in a proof
of claims, in order to help them value each plaintiffs potential claim. The
aggregator could then make offers to any would-be plaintiffs whose claims
appear positive value. Just as before, the claims could simply be held by the

Baker recently explored the possibility of the holder of claims alienating it in full to an
152.
attorney and concluded it would constitute a desirable policy change. See generally Baker, supra note 8.
See supra Part III.B.
153.
SeeAbramowicz, supranote 97, at 739-40 ("A corporation could easily be established to
154.
prosecute a single large claim, and its shares could even be publicly traded, to further facilitate
diversification of risk.").

155. See generallySTEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
ASSET SECURITIZATION (Adam D. Ford, ed., 3d ed. 2010); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy ofAsset
Securitization, 1 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994).
156.

For summaries

of these processes, see 3

CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note

3 1,

§§ 8:1-10:25; 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1787 (3d
ed. 2005).
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aggregator or placed in a special purpose corporation, with shares issued to
the ultimate owners. Aggregation along these lines will often be practical in
mass torts, such as toxic exposures, in consumer antitrust claims, and in
product liability actions.
A unique case involving payphones illustrates both the incentive to
aggregate claims and the difficulties of doing so under existing law.'57 Under
federal telecommunications law, payphone operators were entitled to collect
a fee from a long-distance carrier when a customer uses the payphone but
makes a call using a i-8oo number.'15 Each of these claims by payphone
operators against carriers were positive-value trivially small.'a5 Only when
aggregated did it make any sense to bring them. Aggregators emerged to
collect claims from payphone operators, and the claims were passed by
assignment.,6o Carriers challenged the standing of the aggregator to bring the
claim, but the Supreme Court held that the arrangement passed
Constitutional muster.' 6 ' The Court observed that "we do not think that the
aggregators should be denied standing simply because the payphone
operators chose one aggregation method over another."11 62 Samuel Issacharoff
observed approvingly of this aggregation that "[i]n the context of repeat
players . .. there should be a presumption in favor of private ordering."' 6s The
proposal here provides precisely such a system to facilitate private ordering in
the aggregation of legal claims., 64
B.

VALUING LEGAL CLAIMS

One basic worry is that any market in legal claims might falter because
such claims are not susceptible to accurate valuation by traditional financial
methods.' 65 Legal claims involve a wide distribution of possible damage
awards, from zero to beyond the estimate of harm where punitive damages
are possible. In most circumstances, there will be large information
asymmetries between the parties and any outside entity attempting to value
the claims. Moreover, a lawsuit may be especially difficult to model because

157.
158.
159.
16o.

Sprint Commc'ns. Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008).
Id. at 271.
Id.

161.

Id. at 291-92.

162.

Id. at 291.

Id.at271-72.

163. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate RightS, 2oo8 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 191-92.
164. The aggregation in APCC Services was structured as a series of assignments from the
payphone operators to the aggregators all right in the claims, appoints the aggregators as
attorney-in-fact, and the aggregators will remit all proceeds on the claims to the operators. Sprint
Commc'ns. Co., 554 U.S. at 272. The aggregators receive a quarterly fee. Id. This elaborate
structure was necessary to avoid the historic obstacles to alienation of claims. See Issacharoff, supra
note 163, 189-91.
165. See generally RobertJ. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193
(2007) (discussing difficulties in valuing lawsuits).
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so many factors are thought to affect its outcome: from the performance of
lawyers and witnesses to the proverbial breakfast of the judge. While it is true
that legal claims are often subject to great uncertainty, the notion that these
difficulties are insuperable is belied by theory 66 and, more importantly, by
actual experience.
Legal claims are routinely assigned some value by a wide array of parties.
This valuation exercise is often implicit: law firms deciding whether to take a
case on contingency; insurance companies offering liability insurance or
contemplating claim settlement; accountants assigning some value to
contingencies; corporations evaluating mergers; and, of course, individual
parties deciding whether litigation is worthwhile or on what terms to settle a
claim. Indeed, numerous litigation finance firms have been in (apparently
profitable) operation for a number of years now in the United States, and for
decades in otherjurisdictions. 67 The success or failure of these firms depends
in large part on their ability to value claims with some accuracy.
To the extent that legal claims, as financial assets, pose special problems
of valuation, a number of standard tools are available to deal with these
problems. Steinitz has written extensively on the uncertainties, information
asymmetries, and other agency problems afflicting litigation finance,
analogizing them to the difficulties faced by venture capital firms investing in
tech startups.' 68 Steinitz argues persuasively that the standard tools used by
venture capital firms to overcome these problems-particularly staged
financing, funder control, and a highly incentivized compensation
structure-could also be adapted to the litigation context., 69
Of course, it may be very difficult to evaluate the value of a claim without
the benefit of discovery. Most third-parties that could purchase the claim will,
initially at least, be comparatively ignorant of its merits. We expect that in such
scenarios a venture capital model of the sort Steinitz proposes for litigation
finance could be more generally useful in transactions involving legal claims.
Purchasers, like venture capitalists investing in a risky startup, could make
their purchase in stages, allowing for frequent repricing at key junctures of
the litigation (i.e., after motions to dismiss; at the close of discovery; after
trial), taking an increasing share of the claim over time. To the extent the
original plaintiffs participation will be necessary to litigate the claim, their
cooperation could be secured by contractual obligation, as in typical

166. See generallyJoseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation:A
Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006); Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the
Window?, supra note 9.
167.
See Kalajdzic et al., supra note 9, at 94-96; Molot, supra note 95, at 18o.
168.
SeegenerallySteinitz & Field, supra note 9; Steinitz, TheLitigationFinanceContract,supra note 9.
16g.
See Steinitz & Field, supranote 9, at 723-49.
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insurance contracts,7o or by leaving some percentage of the claim with the
necessary party. 7
C.

AGGREGATION BYAcQUISITIoNIN CORPORATE LTIGATION

Stockholder litigation is of particular interest in terms of aggregation by
acquisition. We lay out our proposal in that context in some detail, while the
particulars of its application to other areas of law must await future work.
At public companies, the instruments of ownership-shares of stockare already traded on deep, liquid markets. In theory, then, aggregators could
assemble a large position simply by buying shares of the relevant company
after a cause of action arises. Consider, for example, a company that is
revealed to have released fraudulent earnings numbers in its IPO, resulting
in a sharp drop in the stock price when the true numbers are revealed.
Stockholders who happened to own shares at the time the fraud is revealed
may be too dispersed to effectively bring securities fraud claims against the
directors and officers, absent a class action mechanism. An aggregator could,
however, after the fraud is revealed, buy up a large enough block of shares to
make a claim economical. Such an aggregator could specialize in estimating
the value of the potential fraud claim and also in pursuing legal rights. Just as
activist hedge funds specialize in agitating for change in firms, dedicated
entities may emerge to enforce legal rights.
Two impediments currently stand in the way of an aggregator doing so.
First is the so-called "contemporaneous ownership" requirement in
stockholder suits. To bring a derivative fiduciary claim in Delaware, section
327 of the Delaware code requires that a plaintiff have been an owner at the
time of the alleged wrongdoing.172 This requirement of contemporaneous
ownership means that those who acquire stock after that time have no power
to enforce the claims. One influential treatise summarizes the policy behind
the rule as follows: "The purpose of this requirement is to eliminate abuses
associated with derivative suits, and in particular to prevent the purchasing of
shares in order to maintain a derivative action attacking a transaction that
occurred prior to the purchase."7s

170.

See Choharis, supra note 87, at 482 ("As in insurance subrogation, a victim could

contractually commit herself to assist in the litigation as part of the sales agreement between
herself and the buyer." (footnote omitted)); Sebok, Should the Law Preserve Party Control?, supra
note 9, at 874-75 (discussing contractual obligations of an insured to cooperate with an insurer
in prosecuting a lawsuit).
See Choharis, supra note 87, at 482 (noting that "[a] victim might also be offered a
171.
continued stake in the claim" to secure cooperation); Molot, supra note 6, at 1o8 ("Given funders'
incentives to ensure that plaintiffs still have some 'skin in the game,' we might rely on the market
to ensure that plaintiffs have adequate incentives to cooperate . . . .").

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (West zoo6) (requiring that a derivative stockholder allege
172.
that it held the stock "at the time of the transaction of which such stockholder complains").
173.

3 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW

§ 3 2 7 .0 3 [A] (6th ed. 2016 supp.). Delaware is of particular interest as the home jurisdiction of

IOWA LAWREVIEW

1358

IVOI- 101:1323

The contemporaneous ownership is also at work in the class action
context, albeit with a peculiar wrinkle. Delaware law has not squarely
confronted the question of whether after-acquiring stockholders are
members of a merger class action, for example.'74 Given this uncertainty,
however, such stockholders have been precluded from serving as lead plaintiff
in a merger class action.'75 They are nevertheless often eligible to receive any
benefits of the class action settlement because settlement classes are
commonly defined to include transferees.'7 6 Inclusion in the recovery class
without an ability to influence the litigation is of dubious practical utility,
given the extreme rarity of monetary recovery in stockholder class actions. We
have been unable to locate an instance of an after-acquiring stockholder
seeking to bring an individual, non-class claim. It thus remains unclear
whether Delaware courts would block such a claim using the
contemporaneous ownership requirement. Nonetheless, uncertainty as to the
viability of such a claim doubtless plays a role in the absence of such claims.
The second impediment to buying into a stockholder suit after the fact
is that purchasing a company's stock in order to pursue a lawsuit exposes the
aggregator to the risk of owning the company as well as the risk of owning the
claim. An aggregator seeking, for example, to assemble a large position to sue
Apple directors' breach of fiduciary duty, would also have exposed itself to
the risk of simply holding Apple's shares. The aggregator, presumably, would
be in the business of evaluating and enforcing legal rights, not evaluating
makers of laptops and portable telephones. This undesired risk may be
expensive or impossible to fully hedge. Moreover, the capital required to
purchase Apple's stock would almost certainly greatly exceed the value of the
claim itself, potentially reducing the attractiveness of the investment. An
aggregator could potentially address these constraints by simultaneously
the majority of large, publicly traded companies, but other jurisdictions have similar
requirements. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 626(b) (McKinney 20o3) ("In [a derivative] action,
it shall be made to appear that the plaintiff is such a holder at the time of bringing the action
and that he was such a holder at the time of the transaction of which he complains, or that his
shares or his interest therein devolved upon him by operation of law.").
174.

See i R. FRANKIUN BALOTTI &JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS

§ 13.25 (3 d ed. 2015 supp.) ("[A] stockholder who purchases shares
of stock after the announcement of the challenged merger should not be permitted to maintain a
class action challenging the merger since he is not truly a member of the class.").
175. Dieter v. Prime Comput., Inc., 681 A.2d 1o68, 072-73 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("The Dieters
were not stockholders at the time of the alleged breach of fiduciary duty. They purchased their
stock months later. While this conclusion does not address the merits of the defense, the spectre
[sic] of the defense does disqualify the Dieters as appropriate class representatives. The Dieters
are not typical of the class which owned Prime stock before the announcement of the amended
Merger Agreement.").
AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

176. See In re Prodigy Commc'ns Corp. S'holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 19113, 2002 WL 1767543,
at *4 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2002) ("[W]hen a claim is asserted on behalf of a class of stockholders
challenging the fairness of the terms of a proposed transaction under Delaware law, the class will
ordinarily consist of those persons who held shares as of the date the transaction was announced
and their transferees, successors and assigns." (emphasis added)).
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buying shares and selling the shares short. But doing so would expose the
aggregator to substantial legal risk because a court might find that such
"empty" ownership of shares does not give the holder standing to press a
claim.'77
What a litigation investment firm would really want to own is simply the
legal claim, not the whole company. The ability to purchase the claim without
purchasing the entire share of stock would, thus, be appealing. Doing so,
however, raises serious practical issues. In the first place, the vast majority of
shares of stock are held in trust in undifferentiated bulk by the Depository
Trust Company ("DTC").'71 When an individual purchases shares via a broker,
DTC does not trace the individual shares, shifting them from the seller to the
new beneficial owner. Instead, in clearing trades, DTC simply ensures that the
ledgers balance for each registered broker at the end of the day. As a result,
it is generally impossible to trace individual shares to individual beneficial
owners.'79 If a stockholder were to sell the right to bring a certain claim for
her shares, there would be no way of "marking" the shares as being "ex-claim,"
so to speak, or of tracing them on an ongoing basis such that subsequent
purchasers would be aware of what they were and were not purchasing.
Given advances in information technology, of course, it would be
relatively straightforward to solve these issues by keeping records of individual
shares and tracing trades on a share-by-share basis.,so It is not altogether clear,
though, whether doing so would be desirable. One of the major advantages
of the corporate form is that the shares are fungible-one need not
investigate their provenance when deciding to purchase. If stockholders were
allowed to hive off and sell aspects of their share ownership, this would no
longer be the case. A would-be purchaser would need to determine whether
she wished to purchase shares with or without rights to pursue various claims,
and determine how much more or less she should be willing to pay. Indeed,
given the multiplicity of claims a given company may face, search costs could
escalate quickly, impairing the efficient functioning of capital markets.

177. See In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ. A. 15 5 4 -CC, 2007 WL
1378345, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (noting that "most securities issued by domestic
companies listed on the NYSE and on the Nasdaq are 'on deposit' with central securities
depositories, such as the Depository Trust Company ('DTC')"); George S. Geis, An Appraisal
Puzzle, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1635, 1636 (2011) (noting that "almost all ... publicly held
companies" list "an obscure firm named Cede & Company ... as the registered owner for most
of [their] stock").
178. See TranskaryoticTherapies, 2007 WL 1378345, at *2 ("The securities deposited as a part
of this system are held in an undifferentiated manner known as 'fungible bulk,' which means
that ... no investor who might ultimately have a beneficial interest in securities registered to
Cede, has any ownership rights to any particular share of stock reflected on a certificate held by
Cede."); Geis, supra note 177, at 1637 ("Cede merely holds a large pool of undifferentiated shares
and does not specifically trace stock certificates to beneficial owners.").
179.
18o.

SeeGeis, supra note 177, at 1637.
See id. at 1665-70 (discussing possible technical reforms).
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Derivative claims are somewhat different, in that the recovery goes to the
company in the first instance. In some ways, this makes the analysis simpler,
in that the claim must obviously remain appended to stock ownership. An
aggregator would not wish to purchase the claim alone, given that the claim
belongs to the corporation and any recovery must go through the
corporation. As a result, the only way the aggregator could benefit from the
suit would be to share in the ownership of the corporation1s Thus, an
aggregator would only find an investment worthwhile if the expected value of
winning the envisioned derivative suit would increase the value of the
company-and thus, derivatively, the value of their stock-by enough to
justify their investment. The problem of untraceable shares, therefore, does
not arise in the derivative context. The contemporaneous ownership
requirement, however, could still stand in the way of an aggregator buying
stock after a claim arises and then serving as lead plaintiff.
Before discussing the benefits of aggregation by acquisition, it is worth
mentioning the possibility that competing aggregators might each amass large
blocks of claims for a single case. This poses little challenge, however, in that
the numbers of distinct aggregators would likely be low enough to be
susceptible to traditional procedural devices likejoinder or consolidation.'.8
D.

THE BENEFITS OFA MARKET FOR LEGAL CLAIMS

Our proposed scheme of aggregation through acquisition holds out
substantial benefits to both litigants and society generally. We explore those
benefits in this Subpart, using procedural aggregation as a baseline
comparison. Our proposal is no panacea, of course, and we confront some
objections and qualify our proposal in the Part V.

1. The Diminished Problem of Attorney Agency Costs
Aggregation by acquisition promises to greatly reduce otherwise
pervasive attorney-client agency costs. Even in individual claims, claim
purchase stands to reduce agency costs considerably. An unsophisticated,
resource-poor plaintiff may have little practical ability to monitor and control
an attorney working on contingency, whose incentives may diverge from those
of the client.' 8 Claim purchase replaces such a plaintiff with an experienced

181. Of course, one could imagine a litigation investment firm seeking to buy the claim from
the corporation itself. This scenario does not involve aggregation, however, and is outside the
scope of this Article.
182. As is discussed below, it is routine in appraisal litigation for multiple petitioners to seek
appraisal, and for the resulting claims to be consolidated for trial.
183. SeeAbramowicz, supranote 97, at 738 ("[Clontingency fees can create tensions between
optimal strategies for the lawyer and the client. A lawyer may have a greater incentive to settle a
case if he will bear the cost of preparing the case or a lesser incentive if he is less risk-averse than
the client, and the incentives will cancel out only by happenstance." (footnotes omitted)).
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party-who will likely pay her attorneys by the hour-with the necessary
expertise and resources to effectively monitor the attorneys.. 84
It is in the class and derivative context, however, where the reduction in
agency cost promises to be greatest. In a class action, the attorney decides
whether to bring a claim, locates a representative plaintiff, and controls the
litigation, including the terms on which to settle.
Aggregation by acquisition changes this calculus entirely. The claim
purchaser aggregates a large number of small claims into a single large claim,
transforming what would otherwise have been part of a class or derivative
action into an individual action. The aggregator subsequently has both the
ability and the incentive to provide effective monitoring of the attorneys and
of the progress of the litigation. It will be the plaintiff making the decision to
bring a claim and hire an attorney, rather than the other way around.
Litigation finance can complicate agency costs in class actions because
the financier's interest diverges from the class members'.85s Our proposal
avoids sticky issues of control, privilege, and professional ethics that arise in
the presence of an interested non-party. When a claim purchaser buys a claim,
it becomes the party to the claim, displacing the original party entirely. To be
sure, the purchaser may leave some of the claim with the original party to
ensure cooperation in the litigation-or provide the seller with a contingency
fee-but for the most part, control and interest in the claim will pass to the
buyer.' 86 Questions of privilege waiver, control, and divergent incentives are
thus dissolved. The purchaser simply acts in his own interests, and the agency
problem between the buyer and seller is obviated.' 87
2.

Improved Compensation for Those Harmed

As an initial matter, plaintiffs will often be able to recover money
damages more quickly when selling their claims than when financing their
prosecution or litigating as a class. 88 A plaintiff receiving litigation finance is
able to offload the cost of prosecuting his claim, along with some of the risk,
but does not receive the cash value of his claim upfront unless he avails
himself of litigation lending, which is generally available only at very high

184.
See id. ("Although [the claim purchaser] may hire a lawyer to actually prosecute the
claim rather than pursuing it pro se, she will presumably be in the business of buying claims and
thus be in a better position to monitor the lawyer and reduce the danger of agency costs.").
185.

See supra Part II.C.

186.

To the extent that the claim purchaser only buys a portion of the claim, some residual

agency costs will be foreseeable, and the purchaser will either need to provide some reliable
assurance against them or pay a premium for the purchase.
187.
See Abramowicz, supra note 97, at 738 ("If a legal claim is sold in its entirety, however,
the new owner of the claim will be acting entirely in her own interest.").

188. See id. at 735 ("A simple argument for allowing plaintiffs to sell claims for money
damages is that they will be able to recover more quickly."); Baker, supra note 8, at 275 ("[T]he
clients would be able to receive their settlement funds sooner and with greater certainty regarding
the net value of their claim."); Chobaris, supra note 87, at 444.
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interest rates.1 89 By selling their claims, plaintiffs will benefit from receiving
money upfront rather than having to wait for their claims to be resolved.
Accident victims are likely to face a high discount rate, as many victims will
face emergency costs as a result of their injury.,9o Even where courts provide
for pre- and post-judgment interest, it is not tailored to the discount rate of
the particular plaintiff, and is likely to be far below the discount rate for many
accident victims.
In addition to receiving their compensation sooner under our proposal,
plaintiffs selling claims are also likely to receive more in nominal terms.',9
This is because claims will be worth more to claim aggregators than to
individual plaintiffs. First, the claim aggregator will almost certainly have a
lower discount rate than an individual victim, reducing the cost to the victim
of the delay between the accident and final resolution.
Second, unlike an individual victim, the claim aggregator will be able to
hold a diversified portfolio of claims, greatly reducing the risk from any
particular claim and rendering the aggregator essentially risk-neutral.9s As
explained further below, a risk-averse plaintiff would be sorely tempted to
accept an offer at the median result at trial, which is often only a fraction of
the mean.'94 A diversified aggregator, however, can either bear the risk of trial
or hold out for a settlement at the expected value of the claim-the mean
result at trial.
A third reason a claim will be worth more to a claim purchaser is that the
purchaser, as a repeat player, will be able to develop specialized expertise and
economies of scale that will reduce the costs of litigating a claim. For riskneutral parties, the value of a claim is the value of the expected judgment
minus the cost of litigating the case to realize that value. The same claim will
thus be worth more to an aggregator than to even a risk-neutral plaintiff with
a higher cost of litigation.'95

189.

See supra Part III.C.
See Abramowicz, supra note 97, at 736 ("Some tort plaintiffs face liquidity problems,
particularly if they face unexpected bills attributable to the tort, such as medical expenses, and
their discount rate may be higher than the prejudgment interest rate.").
191. The fact that so many plaintiffs are willing to borrow at the extraordinarily high rates
offered by litigation lenders provides some indication of the very high discount rates of many
accident victims. See supraPart III.C.
192.
See Choharis, supranote 87, at 480 ("[T]he sale of tort claims will almost always provide
tort victims with greater compensation than would be available under the present tort system.").
193. See Abramowicz, supra note g, at 736 ("A tort claim ... will often be a significant asset in
a plaintiffs portfolio, while a purchaser of tort claims may be able to diversify-for example, by
purchasing a variety of different tort claims, some of which will be more successful than others.").

igo.

.

194. See infra Part IV.D. 4
195. See Abramowicz, supra note 97, at 745-46; Hylton, supra note 9, at 715 ("[T]here is
room for the alter ego to profit from [buying a claim] if the alter ego's litigation expenses are
lower than the victim's expenses.").
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In a competitive market, the seller will receive the bulk of the additional
value that a claim provides to an aggregator. This is so because the price paid
by a buyer in a competitive market will need to be equal to its value to other
potential buyers, rather than the value to the seller.'96 Even in a less-than-fullycompetitive market, buyers and sellers will negotiate to a price somewhere
between the value to the buyer and the value to the seller.197 As a result, the
plaintiff can be expected to receive a higher price by selling than by litigating,
even where the market is not fully competitive. This conclusion is
strengthened by the fact that the plaintiff can simply decide to litigate the case
rather than sell if, for whatever reason, that is the more attractive option.
The policy goal is generally not to provide plaintiffs with maximal
compensation; the goal is to provide them with accurate compensation. The
promise of risk-neutrality and lower litigation costs provided by repeat player
aggregators should tend to drive settlement outcomes closer to the mean
outcome at trial.198 In a competitive market, this would also represent the
amount aggregators would be willing to pay victims for their claims. Thus,
instead of settling claims for the median or participating in the often all-ornothing lottery of trial, plaintiffs will receive approximately the expected value
of their claim. To the extent that the average outcome is considered
"accurate," then, the seller of a claim will almost always receive more accurate
compensation than a plaintiff who settles or litigates a claim herself. 199
3.

Improved Deterrence

A related benefit is that deterrence will also be more accurate.
Defendants will be forced to either litigate claims to judgment on the merits
or to settle with a risk-neutral aggregator for the mean result at trial. To the
extent that the mean result at trial is "accurate," this will force the defendant
to fully internalize the harms generated, providing optimal deterrence. In
contrast, where the defendant is able to settle with risk-averse individual
plaintiffs for the median result at trial, the result could be substantial underdeterrence.-oo Taken together, more accurate compensation and more

.

196. SeeAbramowicz, supra note 97, at 736 ("Plaintiffs will surely pay a premium, in the form
of a reduction in the amount received, for moving the risk [of a claim] onto the purchasers of
the claims. But in a competitive market, the premium should be equal to the burden of the risk
on the purchaser rather than to that on the seller.").
See id. ("Even if there were a monopoly purchaser of legal claims, the risk premium would
197.
ordinarily be between the burden of the risk on the plaintiff and the burden of the risk on the
purchaser, because the plaintiff and purchaser would have to negotiate a fee that benefited both.").
198. Molot, supra note 6, at 86-87; see also infra Part IV.D. 4
199. See Abramowicz, supra note 97, at 737 ("If accuracy is defined as what the average
decisionmaker would decide, sales of claims may well produce more accurate results than
complete litigation." (footnote omitted)).
200.
We are speaking here of a risk-averse plaintiff and a risk-neutral defendant, though the
situation may obviously be reversed. See infra Part IV.D. 4 ; see also infra note 208. In general, where
risk-averse parties can sell claims to risk-neutral parties, accuracy will be enhanced.
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accurate deterrence represent more accurate private enforcement of the
substantive law where sale of claims is permitted.
4.

Increased Accuracy and Access in CivilJustice

Another straightforward benefit of a market in legal claims is that it
would increase access to justice. Parties who are cash-poor, and who would
otherwise be unable to pursue even a claim with positive expected value, can
sell all or part of the claim to someone who has the wherewithal to pursue it.
In theory, of course, litigation finance and contingency fee arrangements can
serve the same function,o1 but as noted above there is little reason to think
that these will deliver benefits for small claimants. Our proposal presents the
prospect of a far broader, deeper, and more competitive market. The
potentially greater scale of a market for legal claims and aggregators' ability
to diversify should enable them to take on cases that would be too costly or
too risky for litigation financiers or for law firms working on contingency.-o2
The actual outcomes that result from this increased access will also be
more accurate. In part, this is a corollary of the improved compensation and
deterrence discussed above. Molot has explored the issue of accuracy in detail
in the context of litigation finance, emphasizing the potential for financiers
to rectify imbalances in bargaining power that might otherwise lead to
inaccurate litigation outcomes. 03 Consider an individual plaintiff in a slipand-fall case against Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart is likely to have a substantial
advantage in bargaining power over the plaintiff. First, Wal-Mart, with its
tremendous financial resources, can credibly threaten to play hard-ball,
increasing the cost and duration of litigation to an extent the plaintiff cannot
afford, thus increasing the pressure to settle. Second, the plaintiff is likely to
be risk-averse, while Wal-Mart is likely to be risk-neutral. This is in part because
Wal-Mart is the wealthier party, for whom the cost of losing is less devastating
than the cost of losing would be for the plaintiff. In addition, however, WalMart is a repeat player, diversified across hundreds of similar lawsuits, while
the plaintiff is a one-shot player with all her eggs in one basket. As a result,
the consequences of an adversejudgment will be far more devastating for the
plaintiff than for the defendant.04

201.
Indeed, the typical contingency fee arrangement can be thought of as a form of
litigation finance, though restricted only to plaintiffs' attorneys. See supraPart III.B.
202.
See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its
Discontents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 468 (1998) (discussing the limitations of contingency fee
financing); Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supra note 9, at 1305 n.i35 (noting that
"[i]ndividuals, sovereigns from the developing world, and some classes-especially in very
complex and therefore very expensive cases that the Plaintiffs' Bar cannot absorb-will gain the
largest increase in access to justice" from litigation finance).
203.
See Molot, supranote 6, at 82-90; Molot, supra note 95, at 175-77.
204.
See Molot, supra note 6, at 84 ("A one-time, risk-averse party will be more fearful of the
worst-case scenario than a repeat player because the risk-averse party cannot absorb and

AGGREGATIONBYACQUISITION

2016]

1365

The likely result of this bargaining power imbalance is that the accuracy
of proceedings will be impaired. Personal injury suits, along with other types
of claims, show a wide spread in the size of damages awarded. A small number
of plaintiffs obtain large judgments, while roughly half receive nothing at
all.2os As a result, the median award (the amount that is greater than half of
all awards and less than half of all awards) is typically substantially less than
the mean award (the mathematical average of all judgments).,o6 Wal-Mart,
with its large portfolio of cases, will have little incentive to settle for more than
the expected value of ajudgment at trial-that is, the mean damages award.207
The risk-averse plaintiff, meanwhile, fearing a bad result at trial, will typically
be willing to settle for substantially less. An offer at or above the median
award-what the plaintiff is "likely" to receive-will be extremely tempting for
a plaintiff facing a significant risk of receiving nothing.20 8
Not only do these bargaining imbalances give inadequate compensation
to plaintiffs, they also lead to insufficient deterrence.209 The overwhelming
majority of civil cases settle, and for the substantive law to achieve its
objectives, defendants should pay in settlement amounts that reflect the
expected trial outcomes, adjusted for time and risk.2'o In personal injury cases,
assuming courts resolve cases accurately on average, this amount would be
sufficient to cause defendants to bear the costs of the harm they have imposed
on others. This result would obtain if defendants settled for the mean award,
which is simply the sum of all judgments divided by the number of cases. If
defendants are typically able to settle cases for the median award-which is

redistribute the costs imposed by an adverse ruling, unlike the repeat player who holds a diverse

pool of litigation risk.").
205.

Id. at 85 (citing Samuel R Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement

Negotiationsandthe Selection ofCasesforTrial, go MICH. L. REV. 319, 3358fig.
206.

338fig.2, 339 fig-3 (1991)).

RobertJ. MacCoun, Media Reporting ofjury Verdicts: Is the Tail (oftheDistribution)Wagging

the Dog?, 55 DEPAULL. REV. 539, 543 tbl.2 (2006) (listing studies measuring mean and median
trial awards for various jurisdictions); Molot, supra note 6, at 85 ("The mean damages award for
personal injury suits in jurisdictions for which data are available is much greater than the median

damages award-roughly three to five times bigger according to a number of studies.").
207.

See Molot, supranote 6, at 84.

208.

See id. at 86-87 (explaining why a risk-averse party is likely to settle for the median award).

209. While our example involves a repeat-player defendant with a bargaining advantage over
a one-shot plaintiff, many situations might involve a repeat-player plaintiff and a one-shot

defendant. Examples might include patent infringement claims, or securities fraud and merger
class actions, where a plaintiffs' firm might have a portfolio of suits while any individual firm is
an infrequent target. In such cases, the dynamics described in the text would be reversed, with
the plaintiff receiving excessive compensation and the defendant being over-deterred. See id. at
84 (noting that "a one-time defendant worried about a catastrophic loss may agree to pay more

than the mean expected damages award to eliminate that risk").
As noted above, we assume that the substantive laws themselves-and the decision to
210.
allow private plaintiffs to enforce the substantive law-represent good policy. See supra Part I.
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substantially lower than the mean-they will bear only a fraction of the harms
they impose.- I The net result is under-enforcement of the substantive law.-,2

Molot has shown that the negative effects of bargaining power
imbalances can be addressed by plaintiffs selling some or all of a claim to a
litigation funder. Doing so replaces a financially weak, one-shot plaintiff with
a financially capable repeat player. Because the purchasing firm can hold a
diversified portfolio of claims, it need not worry about outlier outcomes in any
given case, and can-like the repeat-player defendant-hold out for the mean
expected damages award.21s Of course, one might be concerned about

purchasing firms themselves abusing their bargaining power advantage in
dealing with plaintiffs. But as Molot points out, market competition among
potential buyers would protect risk-averse plaintiffs in a way that it cannot
protect them in settlement negotiations, where the defendant functions as a
monopsonist.214

Our proposal would go even further than litigation finance in equalizing
the bargaining power of plaintiffs and defendants. It could deliver rapid and
competitively-priced relief to claimants, regardless of the per-person
magnitude of the injury.
5.

Equalized Influence on Legal Rules

Another benefit of our proposal's transformation of one-shot parties into
repeat players is that it would increase the ability of such parties to "play for
rules" as a part of litigation strategy. Our proposal would again deliver similar
benefits as litigation finance but to a larger class of claimants.
Steinitz has explored this issue in detail in the context of litigation
finance. Her work builds on that of Galanter, who argued that institutional
repeat players have structural advantages over one-shot players in affecting
the legal system. 2 1 5 In part, this is due to the dynamic discussed by Molot-

21 1.
See Molot, supranote 6, at 87 (noting that if "a defendant routinely settles cases at the
median, rather than the mean, it substantially undermines our goal of ensuring that settlements
approximate what defendants would pay at trial").
212.
See id. at 83 ("[Bly holding out for a better deal in every case, a repeat-player defendant
who faces many suits from one-time plaintiffs can routinely expect to settle cases below the mean
damages award, thereby undermining substantive law goals like accurate deterrence, just
compensation, and retributive justice.").
As Molot puts it, "[i]ntroducing a repeat-player, risk-neutral entity on the plaintiffs' side
213.
would not only promote more accurate deterrence-by ensuring that defendants pay amounts closer
to the mean expected damages award-but also improve plaintiffs' compensation." Id. at 8g.
214. See id. at 8g-go ("There might be a bargaining imbalance between the plaintiff and the
middleman,just as there currently is between the plaintiff and the defendant, but market forces
could counter the effect of that bargaining imbalance and permit the plaintiff to shop around
his claim and get the best offer possible. No longer forced to deal with a single counterparty, even
the most risk-averse plaintiff would have a chance at a fair recovery.").

215.

See generally Galanter, supra note 202.
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that repeat players are able to play the odds, while a risk-averse one-shotter is
more likely to try to minimize the chance of a highly negative outcome.,S
Moreover, repeat players are able to invest in seeking favorable rule
changes that will benefit them in future cases. They can do this in several ways.
They can trade off gain in one case for gains in future cases, either by investing
more resources in litigating for a rule change than would be strictly optimal
in the case at hand, or by settling claims where a negative rule change appears
possible.217 Repeat players can also engage in extra-judicial lobbying of
legislatures and regulators. In contrast, one-shot parties will only invest in
seeking rule changes if the benefits in the single case at hand are large enough
to justify the risk and expense. Benefits to other similarly situated parties down
the road are simply externalities from the point of view of the one-shotter,
arguably resulting in under-investment in seeking rule changes by infrequent
litigants. The resulting imbalance is likely exacerbated by the repeat players'
development of greater expertise and understanding of the legal system and
how to change

it. 218

Over the long term, Galanter and Steinitz argue, this

dynamic leads to litigation serving as a "guardian of the status quo in favor of
society's haves."219
The introduction of a market for legal claims and professional claims
aggregators can transform large groups of plaintiffs from one-shot parties into
repeat players, capable of playing for rules.220 In theory, of course, law firmsboth defense and plaintiff-side-can serve as repeat players and might seek
legal changes that benefit their clients over the long-term. At least two factors,
however, hamper the ability of law firms to be effective in this role. First, law
firms have an incentive to seek legal rules that maximize legal fees, which are
unlikely to be entirely congruent with rules that would maximize the welfare
of their clients. To the extent that the incentives of litigation financiers are
more aligned with the funded parties, they will function as superior
"guardians" in this regard, but will still be inferior to outright claim purchasers
who actually are the client. The second limitation is common to both law firms
and to litigation finance as currently practiced-the fact that the client retains

216. Id. at 99-soo (noting that while repeat players "can play the odds[,] [t]he larger the
matter at issue looms for [the one-shotter], the more likely he is to adopt a minimax strategy
(minimize the probability of maximum loss)").
Id. at ioi (arguing that a repeat player "may be willing to trade off tangible gain in any
217.
one case for rule gain .... We would then expect [repeat players] to 'settle' cases where they
expected unfavorable rule outcomes").
See id. at 98-102; Steinitz, Wose Claim Is This Anyway?, supra note 9, at 1301 ("In short,
2 18.
repeat players both understand the system and have the long-term perspective that allows them
to game the system. One-shotters, on the other hand, may not have enough experience with the
system to understand it. Even when they do, they may not have the desire or the flexibility to risk
a short-term loss in favor of a long-term gain that will likely accrue to someone else.").
Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supra note g, at 1272. See generally Galanter, supra
219.
note 202.
2 20.

Steinitz, Whose ClaimIs This Anyway ?, supra note 9, at i 303.

IOWA LA WREVIEW

1368

[Vol. 101:1323

ultimate discretion over settlement.221 Whatever the incentives of firms or
financiers to seek rule changes that will be beneficial over the long term, they
will be ineffective if the client-who will not share in the benefits-is unwilling
to bear the risks associated with seeking them. Our proposal eliminates this
barrier.
6.

Diminished Litigation Costs

A final benefit of this proposal is that it would lead to lower costs of
litigation. This is no doubt counterintuitive, given that claim that sales have
long been regarded as something that would cause litigation to metastasize.
But as we explore below, litigation should proceed under our proposal only
when the claim is strong enough to induce someone to invest in it. We expect
that many claims currently pressed as class actions are brought for their
nuisance value to plaintiffs' attorneys and would not be sufficiently attractive
when viewed as an investment. Even if the level of litigation under our
proposal were to remain the same as it is now, a market for legal claims may
also function to reduce litigation costs on a per case basis. Claims aggregators,
as repeat players, will offer specialized expertise and economies of scale,
potentially routinizing and streamlining many types of cases, particularly
where the other side is also a repeat player. Litigation financiers can offer
similar benefits in the types of claims where they are active.222 Furthermore,
claims aggregators will invest in reputation such that the fact of their
investment will serve as a reliable signal to the other side of the case's quality,
potentially leading to faster settlement of meritorious suits, which minimizes
22
litigation costs. 3

E.

AcQuisITIoN VERSUS AUcTIONS

In comparing our proposal to the status quo of procedural aggregation,
we may be picking on too easy of a target. The agency costs of the class action
are so severe that by comparison nearly any reform proposal looks like an
improvement. The auction proposal from Macey and Miller is a more
formidable comparison, and perhaps, a more natural one.2 2 4 That proposal

holds out considerable promise, and where practicable would be a serious

221.
As discussed below, this would not be true in the fuller market for legal claims we
propose. See infra Part IV.F.
SeeSteinitz, Whose ClaimIs ThisAnyway?, supranote 9, at 1305 (suggesting that recipients
222.
of litigation finance will "reap the benefits of economies of scale [and] accumulated expertise"
of litigation finance firms).
See id. ("In fact, an institutional commercial funder's willingness to fund a lawsuit, if
223.
known to the opposing party, may itself function as a signal to the opposing party regarding the
strength of the claim. Such a signal can strengthen the funded party's bargaining position and
enhance the chances of an early and high settlement. This, in turn, may create positive
externalities as cases get settled and taken off courts' dockets early." (footnotes omitted)).
See supraPart II.D.
224.
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improvement over the status quo. Aggregation by acquisition nevertheless
offers some distinct and substantial advantages as a structure for pressing mass
claims.
Under the auction proposal, the claim would be sold shortly after the
commencement of the filing. The ability to accurately value claims at this early
stage of the proceeding is thus critical to the success of the auction. For this
reason, Macey and Miller propose some form of initial discovery so that
bidders can refine their valuation estimates. An auction, however,
unavoidably entails a one-time valuation at a relatively early stage, with all the
attendant risk of getting it wrong. To the extent that claims are difficult to
value and the risk of error is high, the resulting market is likely to be thin.
By contrast, our proposal has no single critical moment at which the
claims must be valued. Claims could trade freely before, during, and after
litigation (including after someone else's litigation on similar claims). An
acquirer may decide to make an initial investment based on a preliminary
valuation of some minimum amount necessary to make the claims costjustified. As litigation proceeds, that valuation may become more refined as
motion practice and the discovery process generate more information about
liability and damages. In short, one of the crucial methods for managing the
risk of investing in hard-to-value assets-staged investment-is available under
22
our proposal but not under an auction system. 5

The availability of staging investment will likely result in a far thicker and
more competitive market. If during the course of litigation the acquirer finds
the claims to be more valuable than originally estimated, it may purchase
additional claims to supplement the original position. Remaining claim
holders can share in this appreciation, as the price at which they can sell the
claims will rise along with the acquirer's reservation price. Crucially, the
acquirer pressing the claims in court will not be a monopsonist. Multiple
acquirers could enter the market at any time and seek to buy any remaining
claims and press them. Any holder of valid claims can sell into this market or
seek to pursue the claims themselves. Similarly, capital constraints would pose
less of a problem in aggregation by acquisition because parties could structure
their acquisitions-with pilot purchases and options on additional blocks of
claims-such that securing financing would be relatively easy when necessary.
Under an auction regime, any bidder who does not have sufficient internal
capital on hand would need to have a valuation sufficiently reliable to induce
outside lenders or equity investors.
The ability to stage investment also means that the standard modes of
discovery are sufficient to support aggregation by acquisition. Because there

225.
See Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capitaland PreferredStock, 78 BROOK. L. REv. i 163, 1219-21
(2013); Steinitz & Field, supra note 9, at 735, 741-45 (discussing the benefits and some challenges
of staged financing); Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 9, at 504-06 (discussing the
benefits of staged financing).
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is no single pivotal moment when the claims must be valued, and thus no time
by which all relevant information must be known to all interested parties,
there is no need to fashion a novel pre-auction discovery process. More
broadly, aggregation by acquisition calls for far less intervention and
innovation from courts than would a court-conducted auction. While an
auction procedure poses substantial procedural and practical difficulties for
the supervising judge, aggregation by acquisition leaves such problems to be
surmounted by the creative energies of the market participants. Under our
proposal, one entrepreneurial acquirer can test the viability of a claim for little
upfront cost beyond the cost of compensating the original claims-holders.
A final, related benefit of aggregation by acquisition is that it empowers
the claims holders, relying on voluntary alienation of claims rather than
coercive exercises of judicial power. Under our proposal, claim-holders can
choose from a multitude of potential purchasers, which generates its own
benefits, but importantly they can also choose not to sell, or to sell only to
particular parties. A claim holder may wish to press her claim individually, and
having the initial acquirer clearing a path to liability can permit the
determined victim to tag along. Or she may wish not to have her claim pressed
at all. In this way, aggregation by acquisition is more respectful of the agency
of the initial claim holder. Instead of being forced into an involuntary
alienation of claims through some procedural mechanism, the holder is
empowered to sell outright, sell under some option contract, alienate less
than all of the claim, or decline to sell and seek-or decline to seek-some
relief under collateral estoppel later on.
F.

AN EXAMPLE OFAGGREGATIONBYACQUISITION: APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE

To illustrate the potential for aggregation by acquisition for the
reduction of agency costs and the effective private enforcement of the
substantive law, it is worth examining one of the few contexts in which such
aggregation is currently possible: appraisal litigation..2 6 Appraisal allows a
stockholder to dissent from a merger and forego the merger consideration in
favor of filing a judicial proceeding to calculate the "fair value" of the stock
cancelled in the merger.2 2 7

Appraisal can offer an alternative avenue of redress for minority
shareholders who believe that the price being offered for their shares in a
merger transaction is too low. As such, appraisal can address, in a rough way,
the same general wrong that other forms of merger litigation seek to address:

We have recently examined appraisal litigation in more depth in two articles: Charles R.
226.
Korsmo & Minor Myers, AppraisalArbitrage and the FutureofPublic Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1551 (2015); and Korsmo & Myers, supranote 34.
227.
See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2oo6 & Supp. 2015) (setting forth rules
governing appraisal rights); MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 13.02 (AM. BARAss'N 2010) (setting forth
a shareholder's right to an appraisal). For a fuller description of appraisal, see Korsmo & Myers,
supra note 34, at 859-67.
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failure to obtain a high enough price in the sales process. Two major
differences between appraisal and other forms of merger litigation, however,
make appraisal an excellent example of aggregation by acquisition in action.
First, there is no class mechanism in appraisal. Appraisal petitioners must
affirmatively opt in to a proceeding by complying with the procedural
requirements of the appraisal statute." 8
Second, there is no contemporaneous ownership requirement in
appraisal. As a result, an investor who acquires the stock after the
announcement of the merger may still pursue appraisal. The cutoff for
acquiring stock with appraisal rights depends on the structure of the
transaction, but investors generally have long enough to examine proxy
statements, tender offer statements, or other informational material before
deciding whether to acquire stock with appraisal rights. This means that an
investor can accumulate a large stake in a company after the announcement
of a merger-buying shares from dispersed stockholders for whom filing a
claim would be uneconomical-and still pursue appraisal rights in court.
Taken together, these features make appraisal an example of the kind of
market for legal claims we envision. It allows us an opportunity to examine
two major questions about aggregation by acquisition. First, is a market like
this practical-that is, does anybody actually take advantage of the
opportunity to essentially purchase a lawsuit? Second, does aggregation by
acquisition appear to reduce or eliminate the agency problems that plague
procedural aggregation? The answer to both questions appears to be "yes," at
least in the appraisal context.
In a recent article, we report a burgeoning market for appraisal, involving
specialist firms accumulating shares after a merger has been announced."9 At
least a half-dozen funds appear to be active in the market, with one fund
reportedly raising a targeted amount of $i billion for a dedicated appraisal
fund in 2o13.-3o This activity suggests that, at least under some conditions,
professional investment funds will find attractive opportunities in buying the
right to pursue a legal claim.
In another recent article, we compare appraisal to traditional merger
class actions involving the same universe of merger deals to see whether the
pathologies that afflict the latter also afflict appraisal .23, For the fiduciary duty
class actions, we find that the incidence of litigation is strongly associated with

228. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262; Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule:
Appraisal'sRole in CorporateLaw, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 41 (1995) ("No provision is made for a class action
or other means that would permit shareholders in a common situation to share an attorney and

other expenses of litigation easily.").
229.

See generally Korsmo & Myers, supra note 226.

230.

Miles Weiss, Dell Value Dispute Spotlights Rise in AppraisalArbitrage, BLOOMBERGBUs. (Oct.

2013, 11:oo PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-1o-03/dell-value-disputespotlights-rise-in-appraisal-arbitrage.
2,

231.

Korsmo & Myers, supra note 34.
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the presence of deep pockets and that the raw size of the deal has far greater
explanatory power than measures for the adequacy of the merger price. Our
findings suggest that the merits count for little in the decision to bring suit
and that such actions are frequently brought primarily for their nuisance
value.232 In contrast, we find that appraisal activity is not correlated with deal
size at all, and is instead strongly correlated with measures of the adequacy of
the merger price.233 Mergers with smaller premium over the market price are
more likely to attract appraisal actions, precisely as we would expect if the
decision to seek appraisal is based on the merits of the underlying claim.234
In addition to the decision of an aggregator to bring an appraisal claim
being more merit-driven than the decision of a plaintiffs' attorney to bring a
class action, it also appears that appraisal functions better as a tool of private
enforcement of the substantive law, in terms of deterrence and compensation.
Merger class actions almost exclusively settle and the overwhelming bulk of
them settle with no financial recovery at all for shareholders. For example, a
recent article by Cain and Davidoff Solomon studying shareholder challenges
to large merger transactions in 2010 finds that approximately 8o% of the
ensuing class actions resulted in so-called "disclosure-only" settlements, with
legal fees provided to the plaintiffs' attorneys but no monetary recovery to
shareholders at all.2s5 It is plain that such collusive settlements can provide
little or no deterrence against underpricing a merger, in addition to
providing no real compensation to mistreated minority shareholders.
Again, appraisal stands in stark contrast. In our sample of appraisal cases,
approximately io% of cases had been tried to judgment, and the median
award at trial was a nearly 20% premium over the merger consideration.23 6
While we cannot observe settlement outcomes,237 a disclosure-only settlement
is not possible in appraisal, where the only issue is the fair value of the sharesparticularly where a professional appraisal fund is seeking monetary returns.
An appraisal case will settle for cash, or not at all.
In short, in appraisal-where aggregation is by acquisition-the merits
of the claim appear to be the main determinant of whether a petition is filed,
and the outcomes appear to provide significant compensation to
shareholders and potentially meaningful deterrence. In class actions
involving the same mergers-where aggregation is procedural-the merits of
the claim appear to be largely irrelevant in determining whether a suit will be
filed, and the outcomes compensate the plaintiffs' attorneys without
providing significant compensation or deterrence. These results strongly
232.

See id. at 875-77.

233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id. at 88g.
Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 41, at 478-79.
Korsmo & Myers, supra note 34, at 88 1-82.

Because there are no classes in appraisal, settlements do not bind any absent parties and
237.
need not be filed with the court.
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suggest the promise of aggregation by acquisition as a superior method of
claim aggregation.
Another important lesson of the appraisal example is the overall level of
litigation. Conventional merger class actions follow nearly all transactions and
are regularly criticized as nuisance litigation that generally produces no
benefit for stockholders. Far fewer claims attracted appraisal petitions, and as
we note above we find a strong connection to proxies for merit in those cases.
As one of the most active appraisal litigants has noted, "[t] he vast majority of
deals are fair" and his focus is on "outliers."2s5 The appraisal example
demonstrates that the level of litigation may be markedly lower where claims
must be purchased and plaintiffs' attorneys do not control the suits.
V.

OBJECTIONS TO CLAIM PURCHASE AND AGGREGATION BY AcQUISITION

A number of objections to the alienability of legal claims are possible.
Some of these objections are of ancient vintage and are the rationales for the
historic practice if banning maintenance, champerty, and barratry. Most have
been argued to apply to contingency fee arrangements-which are still illegal
in many countries-and to litigation finance as currently practiced. We
confront these objections in this Part, and where appropriate qualify our
proposal for alienable legal claims in response to them.
A.

PERSONHOOD AND CoMMODcFIATIoN

Perhaps the most fundamental objection to alienability of any type of
"property" that is personal to an individual is that doing so will commodify an
essential attribute of personhood that would better be left uncommodified.239
Radin argues that "universal market rhetoric does violence to our conception
of human flourishing."240 While this argument is undoubtedly more
compelling when applied to Radin's examples of "love, friendship, and
sexuality,"241 it at least arguably applies to legal claims. If one takes a strong

corrective justice view of litigation, what a plaintiff seeks is not merely
"compensation," but rather restitution, including a public determination that

238. Liz Hoffman, Hedge Funds Wield Risky Legal Ploy to Milk Buyouts, WALL STREETJ. (Apr. 13,
2014, 7:47 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBoo014240527023038878045795000137701
63966.
239. MargaretJane Radin, Market-Inalienability, loo HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1879-81 (1987).
For a more extended discussion of Radin's arguments, as applied to alienability of legal claims,
see Abramowicz, supra note 97, at 703-11.
240. Radin, supranote 239, at 1885. Michael Walzer makes a related argument that there are
certain "goods," such as children or public honors, that are-and ought to be-considered
incommensurable, and thus should not be distributed by exchange of money. See MICHAEL
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 95-103 (1983); see also
Sebok, Should the Law Preserve Party Control?, supra note g, at 849 ("Walzer makes a strong case
that as a formal matter, there are incommensurable goods, and that for this reason, the state is
justified in preventing people from using money to distribute those goods.").
241.

Radin, supra note 239, at 1912.
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she has been wronged by the defendant. Furthermore, the plaintiff's control
over the proceeding might be thought to be an important aspect of her
individual dignity. One might question whether the plaintiff's dignity can be
undermined by a voluntary choice to sell a claim, but of course the possibility
exists that such a decision will be effectively coerced by financial exigencies.24z
At least arguably, "litigants should be prevented from debasing themselves by
selling their proceeds or (to take another variation), society should not be
allowed to develop the view that legal rights are just another commodity that
can be bought and sold."243

The most basic difficulty with such arguments is that they are largely
divorced from the practical realities of litigation in the modern world. Even
setting aside more recent developments, claim alienation in one form or
another has long been the rule in the bulk of cases.244 Contingency fees,
subrogation, liability insurance, and assignment of contract claims all
function as claim alienation. And, most tellingly, the vast majority of cases end
when the plaintiff sells her claim to the defendant via settlement. Unless one
is willing to condemn settlement,145 it is difficult to see how giving a plaintiff
the right to sell to anyone she pleases is more destructive of her personhood
than giving a monopoly to her injurer,4 6 or why it is appropriate to allow
claim sale to a plaintiffs' attorney or insurance company, but not to an
investment fund.
Arguments from personhood are even less plausible when applied to
aggregation by acquisition. In a typical class claim, the individual class
members possess only small claims, unlikely to be important to their
personhood or self-conception. Moreover, under the current class action
mechanism, individual plaintiffs play no role at all in controlling the
litigation, and are often entirely unaware that it even exists. If anything,
aggregation by acquisition promises plaintiffs more-in terms of genuine
control and choice-than the typical opt-out class action.

242.
See Abramowicz, supra note 97, at 707 ("[T]here is a strong possibility that a plaintiffs
decision to sell a legal claim will be coerced. An initial inability to obtain satisfactory legal
representation, or immediate financial demands, for example, may coerce a plaintiff to sell her
legal claim.").
243. Sebok, Should the Law Ireserve Party Control?, supra note 9, at 848 (characterizing an
argument from W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative LitigationFinance andAnti-Commodification Norms, 63

DEPAULL. REV. 655 (2014)). Seegenerally EuZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
(1993); MICHAELJ. SANDEL, WHAT MONEYCAN'T BUY: THE MORALLIMITs OF MARKETS (2012); Cass
R. Sunstein, Incommensurabilityand Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779 (1994).

244. SeeAbramowicz, supranote 97, at 710 ("Perhaps the most serious problem with justifying
bans on claim sales on the grounds that they threaten personhood is that we already allow some
forms of claim alienation.").
245. See generally Fiss, supra note 98.
246. See Abramowicz, supra note 97, at 710 ("[Alffording the opposing litigant a monopoly
on claim alienation might be worse for personhood than allowing a free market in alienation.").
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PREDATORYPRACTICES

A second argument against sale of claims is that claim purchasers will
engage in predatory practices, taking advantage of injured parties. This
criticism is already leveled against litigation finance, and litigation lending in
particular.47 The basic fear is that sophisticated investment firms will take
advantage of ignorant and vulnerable plaintiffs, paying them less than their
claims are actually worth. This possibility is made more plausible by the fact
that-as discussed above in the context of litigation lending48-injury victims

may face emergency expenses and possess abnormally high discount rates.
As an initial matter, plaintiffs who decide to sell their claims would be
doing so voluntarily. They would only do so if they conclude alienation is
superior to the other options available to them, such as hiring an attorney on
contingency and litigating the claim themselves. Absent some fraudulent
inducement, it is not necessarily clear why sale of legal claims would be
especially fraught, compared to the sale of any other asset.
More importantly, systematic underpricing would only be possible in an
uncompetitive market. An ignorant consumer purchasing a microwave oven
(while knowing little or nothing about its operation or manufacture) is
protected from overpaying by a large number of competing firms bidding to
sell at the lowest profitable price. In the same way, sellers of legal claims would
be protected by a number of competing firms bidding to buy the claims at the
highest profitable price. Holders of legal claims would be protected more by
efforts to expand the market for legal claims than by efforts to constrain it.
Indeed, to the extent that litigation investment firms offer upfront cash
payments for claims, price competition is likely to be far more vigorous and
transparent than the current market for contingency fee representation. The
current market for claims is highly restricted to a cartel of contingency fee
lawyers. Claims are "paid" for in the form of an opaque mix of legal services
and financing of litigation expenses.49 There is, in fact, little evidence that
contingency fee lawyers compete on price at all.zso The result is that claim
holders typically "sell" plaintiffs' attorneys approximately the same percentage
of their claim, no matter how much the claim is worth, and no matter how
difficult, expensive, or risky the claim is for the attorney to litigate.25' In

247. See, e.g., Sebok, Should theLaw PreserveParty Control, supra note g, at 847 n.55 ("[L]itigation
investment has been compared to usury, subprime lending, and payday lending."); see also Richard
L. Abel, How the Plaintifs''BarBarsPlaintfs, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 366 (2006-2007); Martin,
LitigationFinancing, supra note 111, at 83; McLaughlin, supra note s s 1, at 637-38.
248. See supra Part III. C.
249. See Abramowicz, supra note g, at 739 ("The market for contingency fee lawyers is
effectively restricted to firms that can afford large risks . . . ."); Brickman, supranote 102, at 77.
250.
See Abramowicz, supranote 97, at 739 ("Contingency fees are remarkably constant in
particular geographic regions across lawyers, and there is thus no obvious relationship between
fees and lawyer quality." (footnotes omitted)); Brickman, supra note 102, at 77.
See Brickman, supra note lo2, at 78-8 1.
251.
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theory, plaintiffs' attorneys compete on quality.2s2 In practice, however, it will

be difficult for most claim holders to accurately assess attorney quality, let
alone determine how much greater quality will be worth in a particular case.
A full market for legal claims is, thus far, more likely than the current system
to result in price competition and transparent pricing, offering comparatively
greater protection to claim holders.
Again, this is particularly so in the case of aggregate claims. In class
actions, claim holders frequently have their claims settled for attorneys' fees
with no meaningful financial recovery at all. In contrast to the attorney in optout class actions, firms seeking to aggregate claims by acquisition would need
to compete to provide at least some tangible value to claim holders to induce
them to voluntarily alienate their claims. Aggregation by acquisition can
hardly help but represent an improvement to dispersed claim holders.
C.

MERITLESS AND VEXATIOUS LITIGATION

Perhaps the most natural criticism of creating a market in legal claims is
that it will lead to an increase in the amount of frivolous and vexatious
litigation.s3 While this argument may at first glance have some plausibilitypeople are buying lawsuits!-it wilts under scrutiny.254 There is every reason
to believe that overall rates of aggregate litigation would decrease under our
proposal, relative to the baseline scenario where the volume of litigation
depends on the decisions of contingency fee lawyers. All else being equal, a
claim purchaser would rather invest money and effort into strong claims that
promise high returns rather than weak claims.2s5 While it is possible that high
litigation costs may make it possible to settle even a frivolous claim
profitably,5 6 such suits are, if anything, less likely to be brought by claim
purchasers than by contingency fee lawyers.
A contingency fee lawyer need invest little upfront in order to bring a
claim that threatens significant litigation costs for the defendant. The claim
252. SeeAbramowicz, supra note 97, at 739 n. 185 ("The contingency fee system thus depends
on clients identifying the best lawyers...."); see also Michael Abramowicz, How Lawyers Compete,
REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 38-39.
253. This argument has been deployed against litigation finance. SeeJOHN BEISNER ET AL.,
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY
LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2009), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.

com/uploads/sites/i/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf.
254. See Molot, supra note 6, at io6 (arguing that "the claim makes little sense").
255. See id. ("Why an investor would purposely invest money in a case that is weak on the
merits and likely to lose is hard to understand."); see also Molot, supra note 95, at 191 ("To the
extent that the Chamber acknowledges a distinction between meritorious and meritless suits, it
also fails to recognize what is self-evident to litigation funders: investors can only make money if
they fund meritorious suits. Funding meritless suits is a sure way to lose money.").
256. See Bebchuk, supra note 39, at 437; Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 39, at 3. But see
Warren F. Schwartz & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Advantage Defendant: Why Sinking Litigation Costs
Makes Negative-Expected-ValueDefensesbutNot Negative-Expected-Value Suits Credible, 38J. LEGAL STUD.
235, 236 (2009).
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can be dropped at any time with little or no financial or reputational cost.
Filing a claim is thus essentially a riskless option for the contingency fee
lawyer. A claim purchaser, however, must pay to purchase the claims ahead of
time, and thus faces significant risk in bringing a low-quality suit.257
This dynamic can be seen vividly in the contrast between merger class
actions and appraisal petitions.2 58 A merger class action can be brought almost
costlessly, and the plaintiffs may keep the merger consideration. An appraisal
petitioner must undertake the expense of purchasing a block of stock and
forgoing the merger consideration-a cost that is analogous to purchasing
claims in other contexts. The result is that class actions are brought fairly
indiscriminately against large transactions, while appraisal petitioners are far
more discriminating in targeting the worst deals. This dynamic is likely to
repeat in other contexts where claim purchase is allowed.
It might be argued that claim purchase would increase the level of
frivolous litigation simply by expanding the amount of capital available to
finance such suits. Given, however, the extremely low cost of filing a claim
under current rules, this argument strikes us as unconvincing. In any case, if
nuisance suits are profitable, the more sensible reform would seem to be to
reduce the costs of disposing of such suits or to increase sanctions for bringing
meritless suits until they become unprofitable, rather than to foreclose
markets for meritorious and nuisance suits alike.
More problematically, if claim purchase is allowed, a company might
purchase and bring low-quality claims in an effort to harm a competitor.
Burger King, for example, might form an entity to buy up meritless claims
from McDonald's customers claiming to have suffered food poisoning, in the
hope that the negative publicity would harm McDonald's even if the claims
were ultimately dismissed. Again, though, targeted sanctions against such
practices would be preferable to a blanket ban on claim purchase.
D.

CLAiM PURCHASE WOULD NOT BE SUiTABLE FOR CLAIMS SEEKING NONMONETARY REUEF

Another limitation of our proposal is that a market for legal claims may
provide very little benefit in situations where a party is seeking non-monetary
relief, such as an injunction against a merger or a continuing nuisance. 259 A
257.
SeeMolot, supra note 6, at 106-07 (arguing that "third-party funders would be less likely
to bring [frivolous] suits (at least on purpose) than contingent fee attorneys and their clients");
Molot, supra note 95, at 19 (arguing that bringing a frivolous suit "is potentially more costly for
a litigation funder than for a contingent fee attorney" because "[a] litigation funder-which has
invested cash, rather than just opportunity cost-may not have the same flexibility to mitigate its
losses"); Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supranote g, at 1327 ("A commercial funder needs
to make a rational economic decision to invest in a claim. It would not do so if the claim does not
have merit and is unlikely to succeed.").
See supra Part IV.F.
258.
259.
Maya Steinitz has identified this dynamic in the context of litigation finance. See Steinitz,
Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supranote 9, at 1321 ("[A) unique, possibly socially undesirable,
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claim purchaser is likely to be interested only in monetary recovery, while a
class action attorney can often convince a court to award substantial fees based
on non-monetary relief. Claims with a substantial non-monetary component
might simply make poor candidates for claim purchase. Two points, however,
are worth making.
First, it is likely a somewhat rare situation where a plaintiff would be
unwilling to trade off non-monetary relief in exchange for additional money,
at least at some price. We can imagine, for example, that in civil rights cases
alleging discrimination, non-monetary relief would be essential. Even in such
cases, however, a large enough monetary recovery would create an ongoing
deterrent effect that may serve the same function as an injunction. In
stockholder actions, on the other hand, non-monetary relief is almost never
essential, and plaintiffs would almost always be willing to trade such relief for
a greater cash recovery. Plaintiffs of course commonly bring claims for
injunctive or other relief, but this is typically done purely as a tactical move to
create leverage for a larger monetary settlement.
Second, in many types of litigation, non-monetary relief appears to be
part of a not-so-elaborate con. Class action attorneys can get court-awarded
fees for non-monetary relief, and that relief provides cover for collusive
settlements. The defendant gets to agree to a number of non-monetary
measures that cost nothing (and benefit plaintiffs little or not at all), and the
plaintiffs' attorneys get to point to this window-dressing in supporting their
fee requests. The "disclosure-only" settlement in merger litigation is a classic
example: the defendants agree to produce additional disclosures about the
proposed transaction, and the plaintiffs' attorneys use these disclosures to
justify their fee requests.. 60 This example suggests that, in some cases, the
ability to seek non-monetary relief can work to the disadvantage of plaintiffs.
In stockholder suits, among others, the irrelevance of non-monetary relief to
claim purchasers is thus not an unalloyed negative, if it is a negative at all.
E.

AGGREGATIONBYAcQUISITION WoULD RESULTI INs UFFICiENTDETERRENCE

In theory, a class action should provide optimal deterrence by requiring
a defendant to make good all of the harm generated by her wrongful
conduct. 61 Unless a substantial number of injured parties affirmatively opt
out of the class, all or almost all injured parties will be part of the class. For
element to the commodification of legal claims is purely to monetize all legal recovery, thereby
dramatically affecting choice of remedies. Nonmonetary remedies, such as injunctions,
because the funder
declaratory relief, and specific perfonnance, become unattractive ...
pressures for a simple monetary award instead of a socially desirable remedy such as injunction
or clean-up.").
260. As noted above, approximately 8o% of merger class actions result in disclosure-only
settlements. See supraPart II.C.
See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Mandatory-LitigationClass Action: The Only Optionfor Mass Tort
261.
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REv. 831 (2002) (arguing that for tort victims to maximize recovery, they

must pool their wealth and bring an aggregate claim).
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this reason, all or most of the harm generated by the defendant will be
included in damages, with the result approaching optimal deterrence.2 62 By
contrast, except in the unlikely event one or more aggregators are able to
acquire almost every claim, aggregation by acquisition is likely to result in only
a portion of the injured parties' claims being before the court. The result is
that the defendant will only be required to compensate for a portion of the
damages she causes, and will thus be under-deterred.
The problem with this story is that it ignores the realities of class
litigation. Collective action and agency problems are so serious in class
litigation as to render any notion of optimal deterrence a fantasy. As discussed
above, any deterrence provided by merger class actions is almost certainly
trivial at best,2 63 and empirical studies have reached similar conclusions in
other class litigation settings.A Aggregation by acquisition generates real
plaintiffs with real economic stakes, unhindered by collective action and
agency problems. As the example of appraisal litigation shows, this dynamic
can result in greater actual financial recovery for plaintiffs than the seemingly
broader class action, with correspondingly greater deterrent effect. Given the
frequent ineffectiveness of the class action mechanism at generating genuine
monetary recoveries for the class, we regard it as likely that, in practice,
aggregation by acquisition-while it will certainly under-deter-will still
provide greater real deterrence than the current class action system.
F.

AGGREGATION BYAcQUISITIONIS IMPRACTICAL

A final criticism of aggregation by acquisition is that any such market
would simply be impractical. The argument comes in several forms. Most
basically, it has sometimes been argued that the risks involved in legal claims
are different in kind from other financial risks, and are simply not amenable
to valuation by standard financial methods.265 A second objection is that the
transaction costs associated with aggregation by acquisition would be
prohibitive, given the small value of most claims. Finally, Abramowicz has
argued that a market for legal claims would be subject to an especially
pernicious "lemons" problem.26 6 An initial, and perhaps sufficient, response

to these objections is to simply say: "so what?" The fact that markets for legal

262.
See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
i i HARV. L. REV. 869, 878 (1998) ("[I]f a defendant will definitely be found liable for the harm

for which he is responsible, the proper magnitude of damages is equal to the harm the defendant
has caused.").
263. See supra Part IV.F.
264. See, e.g., Coffee, supranote 16, at 1355-56 (noting that "some commentators have argued
that neither the goals of deterrence nor corrective justice are realizable in the mass tort setting").
265. This conventional wisdom is encapsulated in the old Wall Street folk wisdom to "[nj)ever
buy into a lawsuit." BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR: THE DEFINITIVE BOOK ON
VALUE INVESTING 175 (rev. ed. 2006).

266.

See Abramowicz, supra note 97, at 743-45.
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claims would not be a panacea, and may in fact be fairly limited in scope, is
no reason at all to throw up legal barriers to whatever market might ultimately
emerge. Nonetheless, it is worth considering each claim briefly.
That legal claims are simply not amenable to valuation is unconvincing.
If literally true, it would justify replacing the judicial system with a lottery. In
fact, legal claims are valued in one form or another on a routine basis: by
lawyers deciding to take a claim on contingency; by insurance companies
setting premiums and determining settlement targets; by parties engaging in
settlement negotiations; by contracting parties pricing terms; by corporate
acquirers valuing claims held by a potential acquisition target; by investors
valuing stock in companies holding legal claims among their assets; and by
the burgeoning cadre of litigation finance firms. 6 7 That legal claims can be
highly risky assets, for which investors might demand a substantial premium,
is plain. That this premium is infinite is preposterous.
More serious is the contention that high transaction costs will often
render aggregation by acquisition impossible. Importantly, this consideration
does not apply in stockholder claims, where the aggregator can simply
purchase shares on the public markets. Even for non-stockholder claims, it
bears noting that class actions face the same difficulty in identifying and
notifying potential members of the class, as well as getting proofs of claim for
large numbers of small claimants. The same methods courts and attorneys
have developed for overcoming these challenges could also be applied by
aggregators to identify, solicit, and transact with potential claim sellers. Mass
acquisitions will undoubtedly not be practicable in all cases, but that is no
reason to block acquisition where it is practicable. The costs of any wasted
effort would fall on the would-be aggregators themselves.
Finally, Abramowicz suggests that litigation markets are "likely to be beset
by an adverse selection or 'lemons' problem."2 6 8 Holders of legal claims will

have better information about the quality of their claims, and those with the
best claims will be more likely to keep them. The result is that "parties who
choose to alienate their claims will not be a random sample of all parties, but
those who anticipate that buyers will most overvalue their claims relative to
other claims."2 6 9 Anticipating this adverse selection problem, buyers will be

forced to "discount their offers correspondingly."27o Given that settlement is
allowed,
[a] third party who purchases a plaintiffs claim not only must worry
that the plaintiff might withhold information but also must wonder
267. See generally Molot, supranote 95 (describing how the litigation market works for various
players).
268. Abramowicz, supra note y, at 743. To deal with this adverse selection problem,
Abramowicz suggests-at least as a thought experiment-mandatory alienation of legal claims.
See id. at 757-69.
269. Id. at 743.
270.
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why the defendant did not offer a better deal than the third party.
The defendant, after all, also is likely to have an informational
advantage over the third party.27'
At its extreme, this "[a]dverse selection [problem] can cause markets to
unravel completely."272

The lemons problem is potentially serious in the market for individual
claims. The rapid growth of litigation finance for individual claims suggests
that the problem is not crippling. Moreover, the problem is likely to be much
reduced or non-existent in the market for aggregate claims. In stockholder
claims, the existing stockholders are unlikely to have any personal
information that would give them an informational advantage over an expert
aggregator. The information necessary for valuing the claim would come from
public filings, news reports, books and records requests, or from discovery.
In non-stockholder class actions, the typical member of a mass class
knows almost nothing about the proceedings at all, and may be entirely
unaware of it. Thus, large information asymmetries and adverse selection are
again unlikely. Moreover, given the small value of any individual's claim, the
holder of a "high-quality" claim has no practical ability to simply keep her
claim and pursue it individually. If the claim is to be litigated at all, the holder
must alienate it-either coercively to a plaintiffs' attorney in exchange for a
share of the proceeds of litigation, or voluntarily by sale to an aggregator. The
situation approaches the thought experiment proposed by Abramowicz for
overcoming the lemons problem: a regime where claim alienation is
mandatory, causing adverse selection problems to disappear.273 Nor must an
aggregator worry why the defendant has not simply "purchased" the claims by
settlement. Until aggregation has taken place, either through procedural
device or market transactions, the defendants lack any effective method for
settling with individual plaintiffs.
VI.

NECESSARY REFORMS FOR ENABLING AGGREGATION BY ACQUISITION

A number of legal hurdles stand in the way of the development of a
mature market for legal claims, and the viability of aggregation by acquisition.
If our proposal is to fulfill its promise as a superior alternative to procedural
aggregation, these barriers will need to be removed. The full specifics of such
reforms on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis are beyond the scope of this
paper, but a brief outline of the necessary reforms is the focus of this Part. In
short, jurisdictions must: (1) remove lingering bans on claim alienation,
including outmoded restrictions on champerty, maintenance, and barratry;
(2) eliminate the contemporaneous ownership requirement; (3) retire the
class action in stockholder suits; and (4) require a judicial finding that
271.
272.

Id. at 7 4 4.
Id. at 743.

273.

Id. at 757-69.
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aggregation by acquisition is impractical before certifying a class action in
other contexts.
A.

ELIMINATE REMAINING RESTRICTIONS ON CLAIM AJENATION

The most obvious step that will need to be taken before markets for legal
claims can mature is to eliminate outmoded bars on claim alienation. Chief
among these are ancient laws restricting champerty, maintenance, and
barratry, which serve no useful purpose in modem society.
The general trend has been away from restrictions on claim alienation,
beginning with the legalization of contingency fees, which were once
regarded as champertous.74 States that have not yet acted to eliminate these
archaic doctrines275 must do so in order to foster and benefit from a full
market for legal claims.
B.

ELMINATE THE CONTEMPORANEOus OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT

The contemporaneous ownership requirement currently blocks-or at
least casts doubt upon-the standing of stockholders to bring claims that
arose before they bought their stock.76 In the absence of the
contemporaneous ownership requirement, specialist investors could assess
the potential strength of a potential lawsuit after the event and, if the claim
looks strong enough, seek to accumulate a large position to mount a claim,
just as is now happening in appraisal litigation.77 The contemporaneous
ownership requirement should be jettisoned, which would allow a similar
dynamic to emerge in other forms of stockholder litigation.97S
The contemporaneous ownership requirement is simply another
restraint on alienation-it bars stockholders from alienating the ability to
bring a claim in one's own name or serve as lead plaintiff. Indeed, it is worse,
in that in many cases courts require that a lead plaintiff remain a stockholder
during the pendency of litigation, thus precluding a seller from serving as lead

274.

See supra Part III.A.

275.

For jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction summaries

of the state of play on the relevant

restrictions, see Cain, supra note 9, at 19-25. See generally AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON ETHICS
20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2012), http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethiCS2020/20111212_ethiCS_20
20_alLwhitepaper

finalhodinformational-report.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing alternative litigation finance).
276.

See supra text accompanying notes 174-76.

277.

See supraPart IV.F.

278. A full market for legal claims would entail allowing a stockholder to sell the right to
bring a claim separately from the underlying stock. As explained above, however, doing so would
create considerable practical difficulties, not least of which is rendering shares not perfectly
fungible. See supra Part VA. Eliminating the contemporaneous ownership requirement would
allow specialist investors to pursue especially high-value claims without generating these serious
deleterious side-effects.
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plaintiff, as well.279 A stockholder who wishes to sell her shares is thus forced

to destroy a valuable attribute of the shares-the ability to control a
stockholder claim-in order to alienate them.
The policy behind the contemporaneous ownership requirement is
rarely stated with clarity, but it appears-like restrictions on champerty and
maintenance-to be designed to prevent meritless "strike suits." The policy,
however, gets things precisely backwards..so One source of the dysfunction in
stockholder class actions is this artificial limitation on who can brine claims.
Stockholders who acquire their stock after a claim has arisen would have
considerable time to evaluate the merits of the potential claim before
investing. By contrast, the only investors who are currently in a position to
enforce the board's fiduciary duties are those are those who happened to own
stock at the time of the culpable conduct-and who presumably invested in
the stock for reasons unrelated to the enforcement of fiduciary duties. By
freezing the universe of potential plaintiffs at the time of the wrongdoing, the
contemporaneous ownership requirement keeps out new investors possessing
expertise at identifying and prosecuting claims for breach of fiduciary duty or
securities fraud. The scarcity of suitable lead plaintiffs is thus an artificial
scarcity. To be sure, an existing investor could hire an expert attorney to help
prosecute an action. But attorney control of the claims is often at the very root
of the problems with stockholder litigation. A specialized investor
affirmatively choosing to buy into a fiduciary or securities claim for investment
purposes should signal to the court and to the defendants that the investor
believes the case to have merit and is willing to dedicate significant time and
resources into pursuing the claim. The ironic result is that a policy
purportedly instituted to avoid strike suits may, in fact, be blocking pursuit of
meritorious claims while doing little to prevent strike suits.2S

A full market for legal claims would entail allowing a stockholder to sell
the right to bring a claim separately from the underlying stock. As explained

Malaika M. Eaton et al., The Continuous Ownership Requirement in Shareholder Derivative
279.
Litigation: Endorsing a Common Sense Application of Standing and Choice-of-Law Principles, 47
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 1, 3 (2010) ("[T]he overwhelming majority of jurisdictions (including
federal courts) have concluded that a plaintiff who voluntarily or involuntarily ceases to be a
shareholder, even momentarily, during the pendency of a derivative action loses standing to
pursue the lawsuit.").
280. We are neither the first commentators nor the most influential to criticize the
contemporaneous ownership requirement. See, e.g.,J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous
Ownership Requirement, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 673 (2008) (arguing that the rule "is
fundamentally incoherent[,] . . . [i]t operates largely at random, and it arbitrarily mandates the
dismissal of potentially meritorious claims"); Macey & Miller, supra note 5, at 77 ("The rationale
for the contemporaneous ownership rule . . . appears questionable at best.").
281. For a more comprehensive argument for eliminating the contemporaneous ownership
requirement, see Laster, supra note 280.
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above, however,2 8 2 doing so would create considerable practical difficulties,
not least of which is rendering shares not perfectly fungible.

C.

EUMINATE CLASS ACTIONS IN STOCKHOLDER LITIGATION

Where the class action mechanism is available, it is likely to threaten the
viability of aggregation by acquisition. An attorney able to get a court to certify
an opt-out class will generally face a lower cost of aggregation than an
acquirer. Where aggregation by acquisition is likely to be practical, therefore,
the class action mechanism should be eliminated. In particular, the class
action should be eliminated in stockholder litigation.
In stockholder litigation, aggregation by acquisition is always possible
simply by buying up stock. Moreover, aggregation by acquisition is likely to be
adequate in this context-sufficient to generate compensation and
deterrence superior to that created by class actions. Furthermore, it is highly
unlikely that existing shareholders would desire non-monetary relief, which
would otherwise render aggregation by acquisition problematic.
The downside of this reform, of course, is that it would effectively strip
many small stockholders of their ability to pursue fiduciary and other claims.
This downside, however, is more symbolic than real. As things currently stand,
there is little evidence to suggest that minority stockholders-indeed, any
stockholders-obtain substantial benefits from the operation of stockholder
class actions. Thus, eliminating stockholder class actions would not strip
minority shareholders of anything they do not already lack. On the contrary,
any loss would be more than offset by the benefits associated with an
enforcement regime with genuine deterrent power, together with the
development of a market for arbitrageurs willing to pay a premium when
aggregating shares for litigation.213

Derivative claims raise a somewhat different set of issues. Because a
derivative suit is technically brought on behalf of the firm, with the recovery
going to the firm, it is not possible to eliminate the collective aspect of
derivative suits without fundamentally altering them. With the recovery going
to the firm, however, any aggregator would benefit only on a pro rata basis
with its percentage share ownership, with all other stockholders able to freeride and still receive a pro rata share. As a result, an aggregator will only find
investment worthwhile if it can either obtain a very large percentage position
or if the claim is so valuable that even a pro rata share of the recovery is worth
bearing the cost of acquisition together with the entire cost of litigation.
Inevitably, however, this dynamic will lead to under-investment in litigation.
282.

See supraPart V.

283.

In fact, we observe substantial trading above the merger price in transactions that

ultimately result in appraisal petitions being filed. It is possible this trading is in expectation of a
topping bid or other increase in the merger price, but it also suggests that appraisal arbitrageurs
bid up the price of the stock, effectively allowing minority shareholders to share in some of the
expected gains from the appraisal suit.
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The traditional solution to this dynamic is for the court to award the
plaintiff a share of the award, on top of any litigation costs. To put aggregators
on an equal footing, courts should do the same for them-allowing them a
"bounty" for bringing a successful derivative claim. For example, an
aggregator owning 20% of the stock of a company will gain 20% of the benefit
of any recovery to the firm simply by virtue of its stock ownership. The
aggregator should also get an individual award equal to a percentage of the
entire cash recovery, just as a successful plaintiffs' attorney would. Restricting
the bounty to a percentage of the cash recovery limits any divergence of
interest between the aggregator and the remaining beneficiaries of the claims.
D.

REQUIRE CLAss ACTIONS To BE SUPERIOR TO AGGREGATION IN OTHER
CONTEXTS

In some cases-generally all outside the stockholder contextaggregation by acquisition may not be a suitable replacement for procedural
aggregation. When injunctive or other non-monetary relief is an important
component of the relief sought-as may be the case, for example, in civil
rights cases or cases involving continuing nuisances-the claims will be most
valuable in the hands of the actual plaintiffs. 84 In other cases, the transaction
costs associated with aggregation by acquisition will be prohibitively high.
Due to the variety of possible circumstances, a blanket rule is not possible,
and case-by-case determinations will be necessary. Fortunately, a mechanism
for case-by-case determination already exists. FRCP 2 3 (b) (3) requires federal
courts28 5 certifying a class based on the predominance of common questions

of law or fact to find "that a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy."8 6 To avoid snuffing
out a market for aggregation by acquisition, courts should use this provision
to scrutinize whether aggregation by acquisition is infeasible in a case, prior
to certifying a class. Moreover, there are strong reasons for requiring courts
to make the same finding when certifying a class under FRCP 2 3 (b)(1) or
2 3 (b) (2). Given the extreme agency problems inherent in class litigation,
plaintiffs' attorneys seeking class certification should be required to explain
convincingly why aggregation by acquisition is not possible, with a
presumption that it would be superior where it is possible.
Among the factors a court might consider are whether non-monetary
relief is an essential part of a meaningful remedy. Courts should be leery,
however, of arguments that high transaction costs render aggregation by
acquisition impractical. Indeed, when presented with a claim brought as a

284. See supra Part V.D.
285. Most states have parallel rules for certifying a class. See, e.g., ME. R. CIv. P. 2 3 (b) (3)
(stating that the court must conclude that "a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy").
286. FED. R. CIV.P. 2 3 (b)(3).
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traditional class action and where the lead plaintiff has not acquired any
additional claims, a judge should presume that the claim is meritless. If the
plaintiff were confident that the claim had merit, the plaintiff would seek to
increase her exposure to the upside of the claim, and if the plaintiff s estimate
of merit were commercially reasonable, the plaintiff would be able to obtain
external investment to make such investments. Where that does not happen,
courts should be skeptical. Any attorney seeking to pursue a traditional class
action on the argument that the valuation and purchase of claims is
impractical for an aggregator should be required to explain why those same
transaction costs would not render identification and proof of claims
impractical in the class action. If an acquisition effort is already underway, a
court should be highly reluctant to preempt it by certifying a class. One
possible solution would be to allow potential aggregators to contest class
certification, or to have it delayed for a reasonable period while aggregation
efforts proceed.
VII. CONCLUSION

The development of the class action in the twentieth-century marked an
important advance in the ability of our civil justice system to surmount the
collective action problem in mass claims. Its design promised optimal
deterrence, class-wide compensation, and economies of scale in litigation.
Long experience has revealed, however, that the promise of the class action
is unattainable; the very collective action problem that creates the need for
the class action also ensures that no class members can monitor the
performance of the attorneys acting on behalf of the class.
Our proposal abandons the class action in favor of a market-based system
of allocating entitlements to pursue claims. We would clear away the vestiges
of common law restrictions on alienating claims in hopes of nurturing a
system where legal claims end up in the hands of those in the best position to
enforce them. This promises the most notable benefits in the context of
aggregate litigation. Like the class action, aggregation by acquisition would
overcome the collective action problem in mass claims. But our proposal is
superior to procedural aggregation because it does not generate any new
agency problem. Those who aggregate claims may of course agree to
contingency fee arrangements, but because their own investment is on the
line they will monitor the performance of the attorney closely and ensure that
the ultimate resolution of the claims serves, albeit indirectly, the interests of
the claimants. Not only would this better serve the interests of potential
victims of small-scale injury, it would also likely eliminate much nuisance
litigation, ensure better enforcement of substantive legal rules, and increase
access to justice.

